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Special Defenses
in Modern Products Liability Law*
David G. Owen
Products liability defenses may be broadly classified into three categories: (1) user-misconduct defenses; (2) no-duty defenses; and (3) other, "special," defenses. The first category of defenses, based on a product user's misconduct--contributory negligence, comparative fault, assumption of risk,
product misuse, unreasonable reliance on a misrepresentation-are the subject of frequent litigation and commentary.' Those are the most pervasive
forms of defense, potentially applicable in nearly every type of products liability case.
The second category of "defense," the no-duty type, gives rise to defensive claims that a manufacturer may assert but which may not be affirmative
defenses that a defendant must plead and on which it has the burden of proof.
In most states, product misuse falls into the no-duty classification, although it
is often viewed as a misconduct "defense" because it so centrally concerns
consumer misconduct. 2 Another prominent no-duty defensive issue is the
state of the art "defense." Like product misuse, most courts consider the state
of the art issue to be part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. So, a plaintiff
ordinarily must prove that, under the prevailing state of the art at the time a
product was made and sold, the manufacturer reasonably should have known
of the risk and how feasibly to avoid it. 3 Issues such as product misuse, state
of the art, and other no-duty rules (such as the obvious danger rule4 and the
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW ch. 14 (2005).

** Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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1. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW ch. 13 (2005).

2. See id. § 13.5.
3. See id. § 10.4.
4. See id. § 10.2.
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bulk supplier and sophisticated user doctrines)5 are normally viewed by defendants as "defenses" that may cut off liability as readily 6 as proof of a
plaintiffs assumption of risk.7
The third category of defenses is a catch-all classification for the remaining defenses. Some of these defenses concern litigation in special narrow
areas, such as the federal preemption defense, applicable to situations where a
products liability action may conflict with an act of Congress; 8 the "seat-belt
defense," pertinent to automotive products liability litigation; 9 and the
"sealed-container defense" which, in some jurisdictions, protects retailers in
certain situations.' 0 This Article examines the most important remaining "special" defenses: the contract specifications defense, addressed in Part I.A; the
government contractor defense, explored in Part I.B; the regulatory compliance defense, considered in Part II; and statutes of limitations and repose,
examined in Part III. Except for the regulatory compliance defense, the other
special defenses are affirmative defenses, such that a products liability claim
ordinarily will be dismissed entirely if a defendant establishes the applicability of such a defense to the case.
I. RELIANCE ON PURCHASER'S DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS

A manufacturer's responsibility for design defects has always firmly
rested on the fact that the manufacturer created the bad design, even if only
by including a defectively designed component into the larger product over
which it had overall design responsibility." Hence, the manufacturer of a
nondefective component that an assembling manufacturer buys and combines
with other components in a dangerously defective manner is not subject to
liability for resulting injuries unless the component manufacturer helped the
assembler design the larger, defective product. A manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by defects in its product's design thus rests comfortably
on the manufacturer's control over design decisions and, hence, design
choices that are somehow flawed. Our sensibilities normally would be jarred
if the law were to hold a manufacturer liable for harm for which it was in no
fair way responsible.
Two important products liability defenses are based on the idea that the
manufacturer, relying entirely on the purchaser's own design specifications,
5. On the bulk supplier and sophisticated user doctrines, see id. § 9.5.
6. Or more so, in view of the spreading tentacles of comparative fault which
may serve merely to reduce a plaintiff's damages rather than to relieve the defendant
of responsibility for the harm. See id. § 13.3.
7. On assumption of risk, see id. § 13.4.
8. See id. § 14.4.
9. See id. § 17.5.
10. See id. § 15.2.
II. See id. § 8.1.
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in no way participated in decisions resulting in a design defect-a general
one, based on the manufacture of a product according to a buyer's precise
contractual terms, and a specific one, where the buyer is the government. The
question raised in both situations is whether it is appropriate to hold a manufacturer responsible, if it merely fabricates a product to design specifications
supplied by the purchaser, for injuries that result if the design proves defective? For example, General Motors may contract with a punch press manufacturer to construct a hub cap press according to precise design specifications
that GM provides to the press manufacturer. If the specifications for the press
do not call for guards and a GM worker is injured as a result, should the press
manufacturer be subject to liability to the worker for making and selling a
defectively designed machine? Or, suppose that Wal-Mart designs a toaster
with a dangerously defective heating element, and contracts out production of
the toaster to an appliance manufacturer. Should the toaster manufacturer be
liable for the harm that results from a fire caused by the toaster when it overheats due to a design defect? Finally, consider the situation of an automotive
manufacturer that contracts with the United States Army to produce a number
of Jeeps according to a design provided or approved by a federal procurement
official. If a roll bar designed according to the contract specifications gives
way in a roll-over accident injuring the driver, should the driver be permitted
to maintain a design defect claim against the manufacturer?
Normally, of course, manufacturers are responsible for the harmful con2
sequences of design defects in the products that they make and sell.' But, as
mentioned above, that is because the manufacturer's own engineers ordinarily
formulate the designs used to make those products. Where a manufacturer
simply follows the design requirements specified by a purchaser, the design
and manufacturing functions of product manufacture are separated. When a
manufacturer's role is reduced to merely "fabricating" the product, the fairness and logic of holding the manufacturer liable for a dangerous design are
called into question. Part I of this Article surveys the two principal defenses
that have developed to *address the liability issues that arise in this situation:
(1) the contract specifications defense, and (2) the government contractor
defense.
A. The ContractSpecifications Defense
The contract specifications defense shields a manufacturer from liability
for injuries caused by a design defect in products it manufactures in accordance with plans and specifications supplied by the purchaser, unless the
14
design is obviously defective. 13 From an early New York case, the contract
12. See id. at ch. 8.
13. See Jacqueline Shubatt, Comment, Products Liability-Application of Strict
Liability to the Independent Contractor Who Conforms to the Plans and Specifications of a Nongovernmental Purchaser:Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 9
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specifications "defense" evolved as a rule of nonliability for negligence when
an independent contractor simply follows its employer's directions on how a
product should be built, when the contractor has no reason to know that the
directions are unsafe.' 5 This widely accepted principle' 6 is described in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that an independent "contractor is not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications or the
materials provided by his employer" and is not liable for their insufficiency
unless the design or material specified "is so obviously bad that a competent
contractor would realize that there was a grave chance that his product would
be dangerously unsafe."' 7
The contract specifications defense rests on the fact that a contractor

usually is not negligent in following design specifications provided by a purchaser ("employer") pursuant to the contract.' 8 Accordingly, the courts have
split over whether the defense should also apply to products liability claims
based on strict liability, reasoning that implied warranty claims are based on a
product's failure to be in a merchantable condition, not on the seller's fault, 19
and that the defense is inconsistent with the doctrine and policies of strict
liability in tort.2 0 A growing majority of courts have disagreed, however,
J. CORP. L. 113 (1983); Brent Nicholas Triff, Comment, Should a Non-Designing
Manufacturer Be Held Strictly Liablefor a Design Defect? An Approachfor California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 385 (1996).

14. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 145 N.E. 321 (N.Y. 1924).
15. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Mississippi law); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.
1987).
16. Although the principle is widely accepted, not every jurisdiction recognizes
it. See, e.g., Collins v. Newman Mach. Co., 380 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965).
18. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368 (I1l. 1978).
19. See Maldonado v. Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 662,
666-67 (Iil. App. Ct. 2003) (contract specification defense does not apply to breach of
warranty claim which is concerned with product's merchantability, not defendant's
conduct). Contra Sunbeam Constr. Co. v. Fisci, 82 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969).
20. See, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir.
1975) (applying Texas law) ("A strict liability case, unlike a negligence case, does not
require that the defendant's act or omission be the cause of the defect. It is only necessary that the product be defective when it leaves the defendant's control."), vacated
on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Wirth v. Clark Equip. Co., 457 F.2d 1262, 1267
(9th Cir. 1972) (applying Oregon law); Hendricks v. Comerio Ercole, 763 F. Supp.
505, 513 (D. Kan. 1991); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1021-22 (D.
R.I. 1977), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft,
195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Pust v. Union Supply Co., 561 P.2d 355, 361
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978); Dorse v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1987), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1990); Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 683 P.2d 389, 392 (Haw. 1984); Michalko v.
Cook Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 183-85 (N.J. 1982).
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holding that even in strict liability, a manufacturer who merely fabricates a
product according to the purchaser's design is not responsible, in the absence
of an obvious defect, if the design proves bad. 21 "To hold [a contractor] liable
a non-designer liable for design
for defective design would amount to holding
22
defect. Logic forbids any such result.",
In recent years, the notion of "strict" products liability in tort has withered substantially as courts and commentators have increasingly recognized
the close nexus between negligence and strict liability in cases involving defects in design.2 3 As the strict liability straw man continues to unravel, courts
which in the past declined to allow the contract specifications defense in actions denominated as "strict" liability should now be more open to recognizing the appropriateness of this defense under modem products liability the24
ory. In short, the soundness of applying the contract specifications defense
to design defect claims does not depend on the underlying theory of liability.
Some products liability reform statutes, directly or indirectly, address
the effect of compliance with contract specifications. Thus, at least one state
statute effectively adopts a contract specifications defense by shielding altogether defendants who manufacture products according to the design specifi25
cations of others; 5 a couple of statutes classify such manufacturers as "sell21. See, e.g., Austin v. Clark Equip. Co., 48 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Virginia law); Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir.
1974) (applying Kentucky law); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1973) (applying Virginia law); Housand v. Bra-Con Indus., 751 F. Supp. 541,
545 (D. Md. 1990); Weggen v. Ewell-Parker Elec. Co., 510 F. Supp. 252, 254 (S.D.
Iowa 1981); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 176-78 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Bloemer v. Art Welding Co.,
1980); Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (I11.
884 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] contractor's compliance with its customer's plans and specifications is, with limited exceptions not applicable in this case,
a complete defense to strict liability and negligence claims based on defective design."); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 287 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Neb. 1980) ("[A] manufacturer is not liable for injuries to a user of a product which it has manufactured in accordance with plans and specifications of one other than the manufacturer, except
when the plans are so obviously, patently, or glaringly dangerous that a manufacturer
exercising ordinary care under the circumstances then existing would not follow
them."); Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) ("a contractor is not responsible for injuries resulting from a defective plan
or design if it diligently complies with the specifications furnished to it by the
owner"); Lorenzen v. Bi-State Ford, No. L-93-337, 1994 WL 411511, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 5, 1994); Duncan v. CRS Sirrine Eng'rs, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 115, 120 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1999).
22. Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying
Kentucky law).
23. See OWEN, supra note 1,§§ 5:7-5:11, 8:7, 8:8.
24. See Triff, supra note 13.
25. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(2) (West 1992) (such a party not a
"manufacturer" for purposes of design defect liability). But cf.Neher v. II Morrow

Inc., 145 F.3d 1339 (9th Cir. 1998).

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 70

ers" and so relieve them from strict products liability entirely 26 or contingently if the designing manufacturer is insolvent or not subject to suit;27 and a
couple of others give a manufacturer a right of indemnity against a seller
(such as a large retail chain like Sears or Wal-Mart) which provides plans and
specifications that give rise to a products liability claim.28
B. The Government ContractorDefense
The government contractor defense is a special doctrine that applies
only to manufacturers who contract with the government to build a product
according to specifications provided or approved by the government.29 While
some form of government contractor defense has existed for several dec-

ades, 30 it gained prominence in the 1980s, particularly after the Supreme
Court decided Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.3 in 1988.32 Having redefined the nature and scope of the defense and clarified its elements, Boyle is

26. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (2000).
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-8, 2A:58C-9(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
28. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-12-684(C) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE § 61307(3) (Michie 2004).
29. See Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government ContractorDefense: When Do Governmental Interests Justify Excusing a Manufacturer's Liabilityfor Defective Products?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 430 (1997); Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The
Government ContractorDefense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L.
REV. 257 (1991); Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075, 1091-1116 (1996); Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis: Lessons from
Boyle's Government ContractorDefense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 637 (1990); Joel Slawotsky, The Expansion of the Government ContractorDefense, 31 TORT & INS. L.J.
929 (1996); Carole A. Loftin, Note, Expansion of the Government ContractorDefense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturers,70 TEx. L. REV. 1261 (1992); Sean
Watts, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government Contractor
Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Circuit Split Regarding the Scope of the
Defense, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 687 (1999); Brian Sheppard, Annotation, The
Government-ContractorDefense to State Products-LiabilityClaims, 53 A.L.R.5TH
535 (2004). For extensive treatments of this defense, see 4 Louis R. FRUMER &
MELVIN I.FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 31 (Cary Stewart Sklaren ed., 1999); 3
ROBERT D. HURSH & HENRY J. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (3d
ed. 1990 & Supp. 2004).
30. See, e.g., Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 381 A.2d 805, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977) (passenger injured in Army Jeep accident could not maintain suit against
jeep manufacturer for failing to equip vehicle with seat belts and a roll bar "since
defendant had no discretion with respect to the installation of seatbelts and since it
strictly adhered to the plans and specifications owned and provided by the Government").
31. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
32. The history of the defense is briefly sketched in 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, § 31.01.
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now the starting point for determining how a products liability claim is affected if the product was fabricated according to specifications provided or
approved by a federal (or possibly a state or local) governmental agency.
1. The Boyle Case
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,3 the copilot of a Marine Corps
helicopter was killed during a training exercise when his helicopter crashed in
the ocean.34 Boyle survived the impact of the crash, but, as the helicopter
35
sank in the water, he was unable to escape and drowned. Boyle's representatives sued the helicopter's manufacturer, the Sikorsky Division of United
Technologies, claiming that the escape hatch was defectively designed because (1) it opened out rather than in, which precluded opening the hatch in a
submerged craft because of water pressure, and (2) the positioning of various
36
instruments blocked access to the escape hatch handle. Plaintiff won at trial,
but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of that court's
' 37
and the Supreme Court granted
version of the "military contractor defense,
38
certiorari. The issue before the Court was whether and "when a contractor
providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable
39
As a matter of
under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect.
federal common law, a bare majority of the Court approved a government
contractor defense.40
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing state
products liability claims against military contractors who fabricate products
according to designs approved by federal officials would frustrate the purposes of the discretionary function exception to governmental liability in the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 41 Because military design specifications involve a
33. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
34. Id. at 502.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 502-03.
37. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S.
500 (1988). The Fourth Circuit had adopted this defense in another case, Tozer v. LTV
Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), that it decided on the same day as Boyle.
38. 479 U.S. 1029 (1987).
39. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
40. Id. at 501. Because it was unclear whether the Fourth Circuit had decided
whether a jury reasonably could have found each of the elements of the defense as
formulated by the Supreme Court, the Court remanded for clarification. See id. at 514.
41. Id. at 511. Although Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000) waived the
sovereign immunity of the United States for negligent or wrongful conduct of federal
employees, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000) retains sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim
...based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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host of choices including the "trade-off between greater safety and greater
combat effectiveness,, 42 they involve discretionary decisions with which tort
suits against contractors would interfere. If products liability claims challenging such choices were allowed, government contractors would raise their
prices to offset this risk of liability, passing on the financial burden to the
United States.43 "It makes little sense," reasoned Justice Scalia, "to insulate
the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular
feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the
equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production." 44 Thus, when
these federal interests conflict with state products liability law that would
allow a design defect claim against a military contractor, the state law must
give way.45
To protect these federal interests, Boyle adopted a three-part test shielding military contractors from design defect liability under state products liability law-"when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equip46
ment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States."
2. Boyle in the Courts
"Stripped to its essentials," in the words of one court, "the military contractor defense is available only when the defendant demonstrates with respect to its design and manufacturing decisions that 'the government made
me do it.' ' 47 This may be a fair summary of Boyle's underlying concept, but
its interpretation has raised a number of thorny issues. For example, while it
is clear that Boyle's first element, the "approval" prong, does not require that
the government completely design a product by itself,48 the Court did not
specify the requisite type or extent of government involvement in "approving" a product's design. Thus, it was early held that the defense does not ap-

42. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
43. Id. at 511-12.
44. Id. at 512.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 125 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir.
1997) (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litigation, 897 F.2d 626, 632
(2d Cir. 1990)), vacated by 524 U.S. 924 (1998).
48. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. ("The design ultimately selected may well reflect a
significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor
rather than those officials developed the design. In addition, it does not seem to us
sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in the design
process .. ").
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49
ply if the government merely "rubber stamps" the contractor's design. Yet
the government need not participate at all in the actual development of a
product's design, so long as it genuinely evaluates the content of the contractor's ultimate design decisions.5 ° And even if the government is significantly
involved in and approves a product's design as a whole, Boyle requires proof
that a government officer considered the particular design feature that caused
5
the injury giving rise to the products liability claim. '
52
Boyle raises a host of other issues. For example, the courts are split on
whether the government contractor defense applies only to manufacturers of
military equipment (military contractors): some hold that the defense is so
limited 53 while others hold that Boyle's reasoning protects manufacturers of
54
any type of government equipment (government contractors). As for the

49. See, e.g., Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989)
(although Navy ultimately "approved" contractor's design of diving hangar, Navy set
only general performance standards and left contractor with complete design discretion). "A rubber stamp is not a discretionary function; therefore, a rubber stamp is not
'approval' under Boyle." Id. at 1480. Accord Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 212, 217 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
50. See Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949 F. Supp. 898, 903 (D. D.C. 1996).
51. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; Miller v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. IP 98-1742 CM/S, 2002 WL 31399125 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2002) (surveying case law on government's role in "approving" design), aff'd, Nos. 02-4250, 02-4266, 2004 WL 1663535
(7th Cir. July 21, 2004); Jorden v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 20 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.
2000) (reversing summary judgment where manufacturer of stun gun grenades for
FBI failed to show that FBI provided or approved reasonably precise specifications
for grenade's design or warning labels). See, e.g., Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83,
89 (2d Cir. 1993) (reordering product with knowledge of defect constitutes approval);
Shurr v. A.R. Siegler, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 900, 912 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (defendant
"faces a high evidentiary burden: it must establish that the government approved each
specific design feature in question in an exercise of discretion balancing technical,
military, social, and safety considerations").
52. See Sheppard, supra note 29.
53. See, e.g., In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1992)
(asbestos insulation used in Navy ships not "manufactured with the special needs of
the military in mind"); Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450,
1454-55 (9th Cir. 1990) (civilian government employee injured by paint manufactured to specifications of Army Corps of Engineers).
54. See, e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1119-25 (3d Cir. 1993)
(defense applicable to manufacturer of ambulance, allegedly with an excessively high
center of gravity, manufactured to General Services Administration specifications);
Haltiwanger v. Unisys Corp., 949 F. Supp. 898 (D. D.C. 1996) (Postal Service designed letter sorter that caused repetitive stress injuries); Wisner v. Unisys Corp., 917
F. Supp. 1501, 1509-10 (D. Kan. 1996) (same). In Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516
U.S. 417 (1996), the Supreme Court characterized the Boyle defense as the
"[g]ovemment contractor defense" which "shields contractors form tort liability for
products manufactured for the Government in accordance with Government specifica-
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types of defects covered by the government contractor defense, Boyle by its
terms protects a contractor only for design defect claims. While the second
prong of the Boyle test strongly suggests that manufacturing defects lie outside the government contractor defense," leaving manufacturers liable for
such defects, 56 some courts take the position that the defense may cover
manufacturing defects in certain situations.57 Warning claims, however, are
an entirely different kettle of fish. Assuming that the defendant is able to establish each of the three prongs of the Boyle test with respect to the warnings
claim, most courts hold that the government contractor defense does indeed
apply to (and protect the contractor from) such claims, particularly if the federal contract includes warnings requirements that significantly conflict with
state products liability law. 8 As for causes of action, the government contrac-

tions, if the contractor warned the United States about any hazards known to the contractor but not to the Government." Id. at 421-22.
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir.
1990); Sundstrom v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 816 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Feldman v. Kohler Co., 918 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. 1996).
56. See, e.g., Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir.
1997).
57. See, e.g., Snell, 107 F.3d at 749; Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989
F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993); Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Nev. 2000)
(recognizing that Boyle may apply to manufacturing defect claims but holding that
manufacturer of flare failed to establish that government approved reasonably specific
manufacturing specifications and that mishap could have been caused by aberrational
defect that does not implicate federal interests); Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833
F. Supp. 1486, 1490-92 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (when government involves itself in manufacturing process of sophisticated military weaponry such as Maverick missile, manufacturer of such equipment may be immunized from manufacturing defect claims).
58. See, e.g., Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2000);
Perez v. Lockheed Corp., 81 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 1996); Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55
F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995) (defense established where government and contractor had
dialogue about warnings and government's approval of operator's manual was more
than a rubber stamp); In re Aircraft Crash Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1365 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (Air Force required hundreds of changes to aircraft manual prior to approval),
affdsub nom., Darling v. Boeing Co., 935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991) (table); Miller v.
United Tech. Corp., 660 A.2d 810 (Conn. 1995). Compare Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2001) (Boyle only requires manufacturers of
Agent Orange to warn government about dangers it actually knew and not should
have known); Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 89 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1996)
(defense applicable to warnings claims only if there is a conflict between federal
contract requirements and state law warnings requirements); Morgan v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 704, 717-18 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (mem.) (defense to
warning claim established where supplier of beryllium oxide to nuclear armament
facility showed that government was more aware of the dangers of beryllium than the
suppliers). See generally Densberger v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir.
2002) (questioning whether Boyle applied to claim that manufacturer negligently
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tor defense logically should apply alike to claims for negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict liability in tort.59
While the Boyle government contractor defense is a federal commonlaw rule applicable only to manufacturers supplying equipment to federal
agencies, it applies to products liability claims tried in state as well as federal
courts. 60 Whether contractors who manufacture and sell products to state and
local governments should receive similar protection from design and warning
defect claims is an entirely separate question that the individual states must
answer as a matter of their local products liability law. Most state courts thus
are free, as a matter of state common law, to refuse to apply a Boyle-type
6
government contractors. 1
government contractor defense to state and local
Several states, however, have enacted products liability reform statutes that
failed to adequately warn Army, and not end users, of dangers that helicopter could
become uncontrollable).
59. See, e.g., Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1993)
(warranty); Kern v. Roemer Mach. & Welding Co., 820 F. Supp. .719 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(summary judgment for defendant on all three claims), aff'd without opinion, 996
F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Aircraft Crash Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio
1990), aff'd, Darling v. Boeing Co., 935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991) (table) (negligent
testing); Feldman v. Kohler Co., 918 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. 1996) (warranty). The
result may be different under state law versions of the government contractor defense.
See, e.g., Graham v. Concord Constr., Inc., 999 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (contractor immunized from liability only if not negligent).
60. See, e.g., Miller, 660 A.2d 810; Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp., 661 A.2d
796 (N.J. 1995) (per curiam); Feldman, 918 S.W.2d 615 (thorough review of doctrine); Graham, 999 P.2d 1264. While applicable in state courts, Boyle appears to
allow defendants sued in state courts to remove the case to federal court whether or
not federal claims are alleged or if there is diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., Miller v.
Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir. 2001) (clothing an Agent
Orange manufacturer protected by Boyle with the status of a "federal officer" entitled
to remove cases to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1)); Madden v. Able
Supply Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699-702 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (clothing the manufacturer of turbine generator on Navy vessel with "federal officer" status under federal
officer removal statute).
61. See, e.g., Conner v. Quality Coach, Inc., 750 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2000) (rejecting
defense):
[T]here are a range of other considerations that would compete with protection of the government's economic interests, not the least of which is
that the insulation of the Commonwealth from indirect costs on grounds
of public interest has the perverse effect of permitting a government officer to minimize as a consideration in procurement decisions (at least as a
matter of financial concern) external societal costs, particularly in terms of
potential diminishment to public safety.
Id. at 834. See also Nickolson v. Ala. Trailer Co., 791 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 2000) (reversing summary judgment where plaintiff produced expert testimony that state's design
of trailer for its power company was so obviously dangerous that no competent manufacturer would follow specifications).
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protect government contractors who comply with mandatory government
contract specifications.6 2

II. COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
A. The Dual Regulation Problem
Manufacturers of many types of products are subject to two (or even
three) different forms of safety regulation-by federal (and possibly state)
administrative agencies, ex ante, and by the judicial products liability system,
ex post. For example, manufacturers of cars and airplanes first must meet the
often detailed design safety standards of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration or the Federal Aviation Administration only to be secondguessed by juries passing on the very same issues, years later, when a person
injured in a crash complains in court. Producers of other products, such as
industrial products, have to endure a third layer of regulation, first having to
conform to safety standards of the federal agency, like the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, then to the standards of each state's industrial safety department, and finally to a state's judicial standards of "defectiveness" if the product causes harm and ends up as the subject of a products
liability case in court. Thus, manufacturers understandably question the logic
and fairness of having to conform to safety regulations imposed by the government's executive-administrative branch before marketing a product only to
have the government's judicial branch declare the conforming product illegal
thereafter.
The idea of a government standards (or "regulatory compliance") defense, 61 that would shield a manufacturer from liability in a products liability
62. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1(2) (West 1999) (rebuttable presumption of
nonliability); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(c) (1994) (absolute defense); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(4) (West 2000) (rebuttable presumption); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.050(2) (West 1992) (absolute defense).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998); 4
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 18.05; 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN &

OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16:3 (3d. ed. 2000); Richard C. Ausness, The Case
for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210 (1996); Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect of Compliance or Noncompliance with Applicable
Governmental Product Safety Regulations on a Determination of ProductDefect, 36
S. TEX. L. REV. 453 (1995); Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119 (2000); Lars Noah,
Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability,
88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products
Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431
(1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Regulatory Standards]; Teresa Moran Schwartz, The
Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1121 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations]; Paul Duef-
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action if the product complied with relevant regulations of a safety agency, is
64
a "close cousin" of the federal preemption defense. However, the two defenses are fundamentally distinct. The government standards defense concerns the standard by which a state's substantive products liability law determines whether a product is deemed defective. When a manufacturer in a
products liability case asserts that it complied with certain government standards of product safety, the regulatory compliance issue is whether the court
should borrow the safety standards of the regulatory agency (or statute) as the
formal test of product defectiveness. By contrast, the federal preemption defense concerns the constitutional issue, under the Supremacy Clause, of when
federal law (normally safety regulations of federal agencies) overrides state
products liability law (normally the standards set by courts in defectiveness
65
adjudications) with which it may conflict. While the two defenses share the
issue of whether statutory and regulatory safety standards should bar products
liability actions, the government standards defense is a state-law defense recognized narrowly in only a small minority of jurisdictions, whereas the federal preemption defense is a federal-law defense that binds all courts when
Congress so intends.
A government standards defense, that would bar a products liability action if the accident product complied with all relevant governmental safety
standards at the time it was sold, has a superficial appearance of fair play and
common sense. However, arguments favoring the defense are more than offset by a large number of problems: statutes (and sometimes regulations) tend
to be abstract, vague, and limited in scope and so incapable of adequately
addressing the myriad factual situations that may arise in individual cases;
conversely, regulations may be so narrow and specific that they fail to capture
related activities at the margins of the regulation, leaving large categories of
similar activities unregulated; statutes and regulations are both difficult to
amend to reflect changes over time, and those dealing with science and technology quickly become obsolete; statutes and regulations both are often
shaped more by lobbyists for the regulated parties than by detached and objective decision makers neutrally balancing all affected interests in pursuit of
optimal safety; and, unlike the inherent flexibility of the common law, the
rigidity of regulatory safety standards tends to stifle creativity and innova66
tion. For these and other reasons, the courts have never seen fit to create a
fert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
175 (1989).
64. See Rabin, supra note 63, at 2053; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (1998). A closer cousin is the negligence doctrine
governing the effect of compliance with a safety statute or regulation. See OWEN,
supra note 1, § 2.4. A more distant cousin is the government contractor defense. See
id. § 14.2. On federal preemption, see id. § 14.4.
65. On federal preemption, see id. § 14.4.
66. "Common law tort courts have long provided a safer haven from the corruption that can accompany the making of statutes and regulations; among institutional
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common-law regulatory compliance defense. As discussed below, however,
courts in rare instances do recognize a kind of government standards defense,
and several states have legislated various narrow forms of the defense as a
part of tort reform.

B. JudicialRejection of Government StandardsDefense
The issue of whether there should be a government standards defense is
not unique to products liability law. For many years, many types of actors, in
many types of situations where conduct is subjected to governmental regulation ex ante, have sought to assert a government standards defense to liability
in tort ex post. Courts 67 and commentators long ago rejected the idea that an
actor whose conduct comports with a safety standard required by statute or
administrative regulation is automatically protected from tort liability for
harm resulting from that conduct. Courts on infrequent occasions do make an
exception to the general rule in limited situations where a defendant conformed its behavior precisely as directed by an especially well-considered
government standard.69 But it is fundamental law that governmental safety
standards adopt only a minimum safety floor below which an actor may face
criminal sanctions but above which due care may require the actor to be more
70
cautious.
Following these fundamental tort law principles, virtually all courts reject the general idea of a regulatory compliance defense to products liability
actions, whether based on negligence, warranty, or strict liability in tort.7'
actors, judges are relatively likely to treat injured persons fairly." Anita Bernstein,
Products Liability in the UnitedStates Supreme Court: A Venture in Memory of Gary
Schwartz, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1193, 1219 (2002). See Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety
Regulations, supra note 63.
67. See, e.g., Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 419-27
(1892). "Courts have generally not looked with favor upon the use of statutory compliance as a defense to tort liability." Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172 (Cal.
1993).
68. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21,42 (1949).
69. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
36, at 233 (5th ed. 1984).
70. "Such a standard is no more than a minimum, and it does not necessarily
preclude a finding that the actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions." Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of
negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
71. See, e.g., Ake v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 873-74 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (negligence and strict liability in tort); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d
38, 48-51 (Conn. 1997) (same); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481
S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1997) (all three liability theories); Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 784 So. 2d 46, 82 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (jury charge that "[c]ompliance with gov-
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Compliance with a relevant governmental safety standard is some evidence of
a manufacturer's non-negligence and a product's nondefectiveness, but it is
73
72
is not unimportant,
not conclusive on those issues. Compliance evidence
but it serves in a products liability case only as "a piece of the evidentiary
' 74
puzzle" rather than "as an impenetrable shield from liability. This has been
75
the rule since the early days of modem products liability law, and, except
ernment standards is but one element or item of proof of whether or not the product is
defective" accurately stated the law); Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc., v. Magnetek, Inc.,
582 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (compliance not determinative of defectiveness;
implied warranty). The only apparent exception to this universal rule is where a plaintiff brings a design defect claim based solely on the consumer expectation test and the
manufacturer has complied with governmentally mandated warnings. A few courts
have held that compliance with the government's warning standards precludes a design defect claim based solely on consumer expectations because it would be "anomalous" for a consumer to expect a product to perform more safely than its governmentmandated warnings indicate. This narrow exception was first employed in cases alleging toxic shock syndrome from tampons but has now been applied to other products.
See, e.g., Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law); Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying
California law); Murphy ex rel. Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp.
2d 473 (D. Md. 2001) (applying Maryland law), af'd, No. 02-1110, 2003 WL
21470312 (4th Cir. June 26, 2003); Eriksen v. Mobay Corp., 41 P.3d 488 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002).
72. Nor is compliance conclusive on liability for punitive damages where the
manufacturer knows that the standard is insufficient. See, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler
Corp., 310 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying Kentucky law) (compliance with door
latch safety standard did not preclude punitive damages award where manufacturer
knew that standard did not test design defect proven at trial), vacated by 540 U.S. 801
(2003); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Florida law); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 733-35 (Minn. 1980);
Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 32 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App. 2000) ("no safety related
defect" finding by NHTSA did not preclude punitive damages award where manufacturer failed to advise NHTSA of defect), rev'd, 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004). See
generally OWEN, supra note 1, § 18.6.
73. See, e.g., Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 51 (Conn. 1997)
("[C]ompliance with a federal regulation may carry more weight with a jury than
compliance with an industry standard, because a federal regulation has the imprimatur
of the federal government."); Gable v. Vill. of Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (compliance with statutory regulation is relevant and probative of what a
reasonable consumer would expect when evaluating purchase but does not immunize
manufacturer from liability), rev'd, 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004).
74. Doyle, 481 S.E.2d at 521.

75. Early cases include Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st
Cir. 1973) (Flammable Fabrics Act, flammability standards); LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,
275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (Flammable Fabrics Act, flammability standard),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal.
1973) (FDA, drug labeling); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306 N.E.2d
312 (I1. App. Ct. 1973) (Federal Hazardous Substance Labeling Act, determination of
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for some relatively minor legislative retrenchments in several states, discussed below, the rule is as firmly entrenched today as ever. 76 The Restatement provides quite simply that
a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining
whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to
be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does
77
not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.

An occasional court asserts that regulatory compliance has more weight
than mere evidence of due care and a product's nondefectiveness-that compliance with government safety standards provides "strong evidence" of the
manufacturer's nonliability. 78 And sometimes courts note that "where no
special circumstances require extra caution, a court may find that conformity
to the statutory standard amounts to due care as a matter of law."7 9 While this
is true, it is also tautological in saying that a defendant who complies with a
statutory standard is not liable for acting more safely than required by the
whether substance is harmful or toxic); Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 220 N.W.2d
137 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (warnings on bags of charcoal for home use prescribed by
state statute), aff'd, 223 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 1974); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein &
Sons, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) (Flammable Fabrics Act, flammability standard); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978) (FAA,
approval of general model design and airworthiness); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 281 A.2d 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (FAA, airworthiness standard).
76. More recent cases include United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509,
520 (Colo. 1992) (AIDS; standards for processing blood); Doyle, 481 S.E.2d 518
(NHTSA Standard 208 on passive restraints); Abadie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 784 So.
2d 46, 81-82 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (negligence; jury charge that "[c]ompliance with
government standards is but one element or item of proof of whether or not the product is defective" was correct); Red Hill Hosiery Mill, Inc., v. Magnetek, Inc., 582
S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (implied warranty); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995) (no FAA requirement.of shoulder harnesses in general
aviation aircraft like Musketeer when it was designed); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671
N.E.2d 252 (Ohio 1996) (FDA approval of package insert), rev'd, 709 N.E.2d 162
(Ohio 1999); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997) (strict liability in
tort; FDA direct-to-consumer warning requirements of risk of heart attack from nicotine patches); Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d
1054, 1069 (Wash. 1993) (FDA labeling and warning regulations).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998). See id.
cmt. a (noting that this principle concerns design and warnings defects, but not manufacturing defects).
78. See, e.g., Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. App.
1995) ("Compliance with government regulations is strong evidence, although not
conclusive, that a machine was not defectively designed.").
79. Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d 1005, 1014 (Md. 1993). See also
Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Kan. 1976).
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statute if there was no reason to act more safely-which circles back to basing liability on the defendant's lack of negligence, not on the defendant's
compliance with the statutory standard. 80
Denying a full-fledged regulatory compliance defense to manufacturers
may appear to be unfair because it forces them to meet the safety standards of
both governmental regulators and the courts, but this dual approach to product safety oversight generally makes good sense. Most product safety statutes,
and most product safety regulations promulgated thereunder, are designed to
prohibit (and criminalize) only the clearest and most egregious hazards. In
addition to the problems with a regulatory compliance defense noted earlier,
limited budgets and other resources of safety agencies generally preclude
them from being effective arbiters of optimal, rather than minimal, safety.
Consequently, the law allocates responsibility for product safety, first, to
manufacturers, to make their products reasonably safe and so conforming to
the safety obligations of both the regulators and the courts; second, to governmental regulators, to set minimum safety standards for products whose
special dangers require regulatory intervention; and, finally, to the courts, to
test a manufacturer's safety decisions, in case of product accident, against the
81
common-law safety standards based on balance, reason, and fairness. Admittedly, this multi-layered allocation of safety responsibility is somewhat
complicated and burdensome on manufacturers, but it normally works quite
deciwell to minimize government intrusion into product design and labeling
82
consumers.
product
of
rights
safety
basic
the
sions while protecting
Litigation involving industrial machinery raises an interesting question
of the admissibility of evidence that a manufacturer's industrial product complied with safety regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the federal agency which regulates the safety of products in
the workplace. 83 Manufacturers normally are eager to introduce such evidence, not only to show that their products met these safety standards, and so
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965). Thus, in
Beatty, the court, applying the statutory standard as a matter of law, ruled for the
defendant because the plaintiff had failed to prove that the product, "either for negligence or strict liability purposes, was foreseeably unsafe, defective, or unreasonably
dangerous." Beatty, 625 A.2d at 1014.
81. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward FirstPrinciples,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993).
82. Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997):
It has long been the concern of this state to protect the health and safety of
It is the widely held view that the FDA sets minimum
its citizens ....
standards for drug manufacturers as to design and warnings. We conclude
that compliance with these minimum standards does not necessarily complete the manufacturer's duty.
Id. at 302 (citation omitted).
83. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-700
(2000).
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are at least arguably nondefective, but also to help focus the jury's attention,
first, on the employer's role in causing (or at least in not preventing) the injury, perhaps by failing to equip a machine with a safety device, and, second,
on the possibility that the employee may have received workers' compensation. Manufacturers normally are barred from introducing evidence or argument directly on these issues,84 and using evidence of compliance with OSHA
standards may permit a manufacturer's counsel to get the jury thinking about
these other factors related to the larger responsibility and compensation issues
present in such cases. For these same reasons, plaintiffs' counsel seek to exclude evidence on an industrial machine's compliance with OSHA standards,
to keep attention focused on the manufacturer's responsibility for the injury.
But cases involving compliance with OSHA regulations are different
from other types of regulatory compliance cases because OSHA standards on
design and warnings requirements of industrial machinery impose requirements for employers, not manufacturers. 8 Nevertheless, such standards do set
safety minimums for industrial products which would seem to have some
relevance to the issue of product defectiveness in products liability litigation.
Because such regulations do have at least some minimal relevance to product
defectiveness, with respect to a manufacturer's risk-benefit analysis86 and
87
possibly to a user's safety expectations, many courts allow evidence of a
product's compliance with relevant OSHA standards in a products liability
action against the manufacturer.88 Because of the limited relevance and prob-

84. Workers' compensation statutes bar employees from suing their own employers in tort for workplace injuries, of course, in exchange for guaranteed compensation under such insurance systems. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 15.6; Paul C. Weiler,
Workers' Compensation and ProductLiability: The Interactionof a Tort and a NonTort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989).

85. See, e.g., Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985);
Hughes v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 2 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
86. See Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga.
1997); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, 1987 WL 6486, at *31-33 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987) (per curiam).
87. See Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 50 (Conn. 1997).
88. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1144 (5th
Cir. 1985); Vaughn v. Cannon U.S.A., Inc., No. G89-40240CA, 1990 WL 369721
(W.D. Mich. May 10, 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1991) (table); Deyoe v.
Clark Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1333, 1337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Wagner, 700 A.2d at
48-51; Couch v. Astec Indus., Inc., 53 P.3d 398 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to
comply with OSHA regulations relevant to prove that manufacturer was negligent);
Knitz, 1987 WL 6486, at *27-33 (evidence of OSHA standards and those of Ohio's
Industrial Commission, while not conclusive of liability, are relevant and admissible
to prove feasibility of design, availability of alternative safeguards, and other factors
relevant to a risk-benefit determination of defectiveness); Saphore v. Clark Equip.,
570 A.2d 1094 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (table); Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp., 932
S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. 1995).
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able prejudice of such evidence, other courts hold that OSHA safety standards
are generally inadmissible in products liability litigation. 9
C. Special Situations Where Compliance with Safety Standards
May Be Conclusive
In certain limited situations, federal and state regulators study and regulate the safety of particular aspects of particular products especially closely.
In such situations, if an agency has reasonably settled on a specific safety
standard that appears optimal at the time, then much may be said for foreclosing products liability actions that demand more safety of manufacturers than
the agency determined was appropriate. The CPSC, for example, after conducting a major study of the problem of injuries to operators of power mowers, adopted a regulation requiring that manufacturers design their mowers so
that the blades will stop rotating within three seconds of the time an operator
releases the control handle. 90 Apart from the possibility of federal preemption, 9' and assuming that technology has not advanced sufficiently to resolve
the problem in a clearly better way, a court might reasonably decide not to
permit an operator, injured when his foot slips beneath the mower, to attempt
to prove that the mower's design was defective because the blade did not stop
within two seconds after the handle was released.
A good example of a situation where a court chose to adopt a regulatory
standard as a matter of law is Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.92 In this case, a fourmonth-old child contracted Reye's Syndrome after his Spanish-speaking
mother gave him some St. Joseph's Aspirin for Children to relieve his symptoms of a cold.93 The aspirin's label warned of the risk only in English, not in
Spanish. 94 Although the FDA specifically permitted English-only labeling,
95
the plaintiff claimed that the failure to warn in Spanish was inadequate.
After considering the web of rules on foreign-language labeling requirements
in various other contexts adopted by the California legislature; the FDA's
89. See, e.g., Hughes v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 2 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999). See generally 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 18.05[3] (citing
cases both ways); R. Hogan & R. Moran, The Use of OSHA in Private Litigation, 312 Occupational Safety and Health Act (MB) (2004); Michael J. Sints, OSHA Compliance: Can it be Used to Show that a Product is Safe?, 4 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 156
(1993).
90. Details of the study and regulation are examined in Southland Mower Co. v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 619 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), which upheld
the CPSC's three-second blade-stop criterion.
91. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 14.4.
92. 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993). Ramirez is also examined in OWEN, supra note 1,
§ 9.4.
93. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 1169.
94. Id. at 173.
95. Id. at 173-77.
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quite specific rules governing foreign-language labeling that permitted but
did not require such labeling; and the multiplicity of health, social, cost, and
practicability factors; the court concluded that foreign-language labeling requirements were better determined by legislatures and regulatory agencies
than by the courts. For this reason, the court chose to adopt the legislative/regulatory rule permitting English-only warnings as the safety standard
that properly should be applied in the case.96
The Food and Drug Administration closely reviews applications submitted by pharmaceutical manufacturers for new prescription drugs. Scrupulously evaluating the clinical data provided by the manufacturer, the agency
balances the safety and efficacy of each proposed new drug and evaluates the
adequacy of proposed warnings and usage information to be provided to doctors who will prescribe the drug. If the FDA fully and fairly evaluates all of
this information, and approves for sale the drug and warnings, then it would
seem to make little sense to let a jury reevaluate the same information and
find the drug or warnings "defective. 97 On this basis, at least two states have
immunized manufacturers of prescription drugs from strict liability, 9s and
another has ruled that a manufacturer's compliance with FDA regulations for
warnings in direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the warnings satisfy the duty to warn. 99 When a
plaintiff is harmed by an aspect of a product that met an applicable safety
standard which the FDA or other regulatory agency scrupulously investigated
and approved, and the perfect agency model fits the situation quite closely,
then a court may properly conclude that the product's compliance with the
governmentally approved safety standard conclusively establishes that the
challenged aspect of the product was not defective.1° ° Such cases, however,
will be unusual.
96. Id. at 177. Noting that the FDA stresses the importance of "uniformity in
presentation and clarity of message," the court concluded:
To preserve that uniformity and clarity, to avoid adverse impacts upon the
warning requirements mandated by the federal regulatory scheme, and in
deference to the superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources of
legislative and administrative bodies, we adopt the legislative/regulatory
standard of care that mandates nonprescription drug package warnings in
English only.
Id.
97. See Noah, supra note 63.
98. See Brown v. Superior. Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). See OWEN, supra note 1, § 8.10.
99. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999). "For all
practical purposes, absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired
knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA standards should be virtually
dispositive of such claims. By definition, the advertising will have been 'fairly balanced."' Id.
100. See, e.g., Dentson v. Eddins & Lee Bus Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala.
1986) ("[I]n this context, involving school transportation, an area traditionally re-
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The model of a perfect FDA-fully informed of a drug's foreseeable
hazards before the drug is marketed, kept fully informed thereafter of adverse
drug-reactions, fully funded by Congress, and with no political pressure to
expedite the approval of new drugs-usually does not fit the real world
closely. 01 For this reason, courts should almost always base defectiveness
determinations on broader considerations than a manufacturer's compliance
with an administrative agency's product safety regulation--even if the safety
standard applies directly to the product feature of which the plaintiff complains, and even if the agency's procedures normally are rigorous and precise-because of the probability of imperfections in the safety standard or the
agency's procedures in any particular case. Thus, courts and juries should
give only such weight to a product's compliance with a governmental02 safety
standard as is warranted by the particular circumstances of each case.1

served for the legislature, we find that the legislature's pronouncement is conclusive:
a school bus in Alabama may not be found defective .. .because it is not equipped

with passenger seat belts."). The Restatement provides:
Occasionally, after reviewing relevant circumstances, a court may properly conclude that a particular product safety standard set by statute or
regulation adequately serves the objectives of tort law and therefore that
the product that complies with the standard is not defective as a matter of
law. Such a conclusion may be appropriate when the safety statute or
regulation was promulgated recently, thus supplying currency to the standard therein established; when the specific standard addresses the very issue of product design or warning presented in the case before the court;
and when the court is confident that the deliberative process by which the
safety standard was established was full, fair, and through and reflected
substantial expertise.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 4 cmt. e (1998).
101. See Rabin, supra note 63; Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations,
supra note 63. An example is Tobin v. Astra PharmaceuticalProducts,Inc., 993 F.2d

528 (6th Cir. 1993), where plaintiff "presented an articulable basis for disregarding
the FDA's finding that ritodrine was effective... : the individual studies relied on by
the FDA were insufficient to support a finding of efficacy as found by the FDA Advisory Committee, and the pooled data requested by the Advisory Committee was statistically invalid." Id. at 538 (applying Kentucky law). Although its safety decisions
may be better than those of other agencies, the FDA is not immune to criticism. See,
e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug to Treat Bowel Illness Is Approved by the F.D.A., N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A12 (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director of the Public Citi-

zen Health Research Group, who characterized the FDA's approval as "a very bad
decision" because of its marginal effectiveness, the fact that it appears to increase the
risk of ovarian cysts, and the availability of over-the-counter medicines to treat the
condition). Despite its real-world shortcomings, the FDA's safety standards are
probably closer to optimal than any other agency. See, e.g., Green & Schultz, supra
note 63, at 2122.
102. See Rabin, supra note 63.
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D. State Reform Legislation
About a dozen states have enacted products liability reform statutes concerning the effect of a manufacturer's compliance with a governmental safety
standard. Commonly, the statutes create a rebuttable' 0 3 presumption that a
product was not defective--or that a product was not defective and that the
manufacturer or seller was not negligent-if the product complied with applicable state or federal safety statutes or agency regulations. For example,
Michigan's statute provides that "there is a rebuttable presumption that the
manufacturer or seller is not liable if... the aspect of the product that allegedly caused the harm was in compliance with standards relevant to the event
causing the death or injury set forth in a federal or state statute or ... regulations."' 4 Taking a slightly different approach, the Kansas statute provides
that, if a product conforms to a governmental safety standard, the plaintiff
must prove "that a reasonably prudent product seller could and would have
taken additional precautions."'10 5 Three statutes restate the common law rule
on compliance, stating merely that a manufacturer's compliance with govemnment standards may be considered by the trier of fact. 106 Several statutes
103. Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof on negligence and product defect
anyway, it is difficult to understand what if any additional proof a plaintiff must offer
to rebut such a presumption. In Duffee v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co., 879 F.
Supp. 1078 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 1410 (10th Cir. 1996), the court suggested
that a plaintiffs rebuttal could consist of proof that (1) the regulatory standards were
outdated, or (2) that a reasonable manufacturer would know of dangers in the product's use not contemplated by the standard. Alternatively, it would seem that rebuttal
evidence could lie in the plaintiff's proofs on negligence or defectiveness in the prima
facie case. Expert testimony is not necessarily required to rebut such a presumption.
See, e.g., Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 706-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (airbag that
met Standard 208 failed to inflate in crash; circumstantial evidence of defectiveness
sufficient to overcome presumption). A Tennessee court has held that compliance
with OSHA regulations does not create a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness
under that state's statute because the regulations apply to employers, not manufacturers. See Hughes v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 2 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
104. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(4) (West 2000). See also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1(2) (West 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002). For an example of decisions applying these presumptions,
see Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. N.D. 2002) (evidence
that prescription drug Adderall was used for "off-label" illnesses overcame statutory
presumption of no defect from compliance with FDA standards), affd, 367 F.3d 1013
(8th Cir. 2004); Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (plaintiff overcame statutory presumption of no defect from compliance with
government standard for child booster seats).
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1994).
106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (Michie 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.75(B)(4) (Anderson 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West 1992).
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are directed at drugs that comport with FDA standards, one raising a rebuttable presumption that complying warnings are adequate, 0 7 another giving
manufacturers of complying drugs complete immunity,' 08 and several barring
punitive damages for drugs marketed with FDA approval. 109

III.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE

A. Nature of Time Limitation Statutes
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose impose maximum time limits on products liability claims. Both forms of time limitation statute cut off a
plaintiff's rights after a particular period of time, although the period within
which a plaintiff must file a claim may be extended in certain limited circumstances. If the plaintiff files a products liability claim after the statutory period has run, the time limitation statute simply bars the claim. A statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense, and the defendant must raise it in a
timely manner, which ordinarily means that it must be pleaded in the answer. °0 By contrast, because a statute of repose cuts off the plaintiffs rights
at the expiration of the time period, rather than just the remedy, the defendant
does not waive the running of a statute of repose by failing to raise it in a
timely manner."' Statutes of limitations and repose provide a potent defense
to products liability actions that a plaintiffs lawyer must seek to avoid and a
defendant's lawyer must be sure not to overlook.' 12
107. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000).
108. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5). This statutory immunity has survived constitutional attack. See Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d

127 (Mich. 2003); Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 265 F. Supp. 2d 825 (E.D. Mich.
2003), aff'd, 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004).
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C5(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2003); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-2. The statutes provide that protection from punitive damages is
lost if the manufacturer knowingly withholds or misrepresents pertinent information.
110. See FED. R. Cry. P. 8(c); 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS §
15.2.1, at 349 (1991) (noting "the uniform requirement that when the statute of limitations is used as a defense it must be set forth affirmatively in a party's responsive
pleading"). But a court in its discretion may allow the defendant to amend its answer
to include the defense if doing so is not unfair or prejudicial to the plaintiff. See id. §
15.3, at 355-58. If the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint,
the defendant may raise the defense by a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Albrecht v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 2002). See generally 2 CORMAN, supra,
§ 15.1.3.
111. 2 CORMAN,supra note 110, § 15.2.3, at 355.
112. On statutes of limitations and repose in products liability litigation, see I
CORMAN, supra note 110, § 5.27; 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at ch. 26; 4
HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 29, at ch. 47; KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, § 30; 2
OWEN ET AL., supra note 63, § 16:1 & ch. 31; Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Di-
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As creatures of state legislation (with one exception'13), time limitation
statutes vary widely in their provisions-their time periods, what starts the
clock running, what stops it running, what types of claims they affect, and in
many other respects. Moreover, courts vary over time in how they interpret
and apply similar provisions of similar statutes. Accordingly, each state has
developed its own complex set of rules, both statutory and judicial, detailing
the time periods within which various types of products liability claims must
be filed to escape the time limitation defenses. More so than with many other
issues in products liability litigation, therefore, the law on time limitation
issues in products liability cases tends to be unusually twisted and particularly
localized. Thus, outcomes in particular cases involving time limitation statutes are controlled by the language of particular statutes as interpreted by
courts of varying persuasions in particular jurisdictions, according to particular common-law rules, and applied in varying fashions to the facts of particular cases. Because so many cases have been decided so many different ways
on limitations issues in every jurisdiction, 114 little can be said about statutes
of limitations and repose for which there is not contrary authority. For this
reason, a lawyer must study the local statutory and case law especially closely
in an attempt to fathom how a court might rule on a limitations issue in any
particular case. Nevertheless, a general description of some of the recurring
mension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1986); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965

(1988) (limitation statutes should be abolished in toxic substance cases to promote
more accurate fact finding, efficiency, and fairness); Jerry J. Phillips, An Analysis of
ProposedReform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L. REV. 663
(1978); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796 (1983); E.E. Woods, Annotation, Statute of Limitations:
When Cause of Action Arises on Action Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product

Causing Injury or Death, 4 A.L.R.3D, § 4 (1965); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity
and Construction of Statute Terminating Right of Action for Product-causedInjury at
Fixed PeriodAfter Manufacture, Sale, or Delivery of Product, 30 A.L.R.5TH 1, §§ 16,

30 (1995) (discussing products liability statutes of repose and latent industrial diseases); 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) l 3100, 3130.
113. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), 49 U.S.C. §
40101 (2000), examined below, is the one federal time limitation statute applicable to
products liability litigation. Congress has enacted a discovery rule for personal injury
and property damages actions brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9658
(2000). For a variety of reasons, the courts have held that this statute does not apply in
product liability actions. See, e.g., Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (CERCLA federal discovery rule does not preempt state time
limits in toxic tort claims asserted against third party manufacturers because Congress
did not have such actions in mind when drafting the relevant CERCLA provisions).
The discovery rule is discussed in more detail below.
114. "It would be a laborious and unprofitable task, to examine all the cases which
have been decided, on the statute of limitations." Fries v. Boisselet, 9 Serg. & Rawle
128, 131 (Pa. 1822).
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issues in this area of the law may be useful to a lawyer getting started on a
limitations problem.
1. Reasons for Time Limitations
It may seem unjust for a legislature to terminate the legal responsibility
of a party who has wrongfully caused harm to another person, no matter how
much time has passed since the harmful event occurred. Yet the law has rec-6
1
ognized across the ages-from early Hebrew law, 5 to late Roman law,"
thence into early German law, 1 7 in early English law," 8 and in the early law
of this nation" 9 -that there is good reason to call a halt to legal responsibility
for most wrongs after some period of time. In the products liability context, a
major reason for eventually calling an end to litigation about old products is
the simple fact that the available proofs-of the manufacturer's alleged
wrongdoing, the product's alleged defectiveness, the plaintiffs alleged
harms, and the alleged causal connection between them all-diminish over
time. The legal system thus operates less accurately and hence less fairly in
attempting to ascertain responsibility for harm as the years roll by after dam-

115. See Deuteronomy 15:1 (7 years-money debts should be cancelled).
116. See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 54, at 282-85 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d
ed. 1970) (temporal limitations on civil actions were "quite exceptional" prior to 424
C.E., but from that date forward most claims were barred after thirty years, some after
forty years, and some after shorter periods). See also LEOPOLD WENGER, INSTITUTES
OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16(7), at 170, and § 29(V), at 302-03
(Otis Harrison Fisk trans., 1940).
117. SOHM, supra note 116, at 284.
118. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
719 (5th ed. 1956) (after 1540, "no seisin could found a claim in a writ of right unless
it was within sixty years of the date of the writ").
119. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (citing Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) and other cases):
Statutes of limitations, which "are found and approved in all systems of
enlightened jurisprudence," Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879),
represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the
adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that
"the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right
to prosecute them." Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
321 U.S. 342, 249 (1944). These enactments are statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to
present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to
deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by
the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.
See generally I CORMAN, supra note 110, § 1.1.
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aging events: 120 witnesses (and the parties and their agents) forget important
facts, move, grow old, and eventually die; defendant manufacturers change
their personnel, merge, and otherwise transform in myriad ways; and physical
objects pertinent to a particular case-the product, its environment of use and
failure, and documentary evidence of its creation, the accident, and the plaintiffs injuries--deteriorate, are discarded, or otherwise disappear. In addition
to these practical reasons of diminishing proof for time limitation statutes,
they are substantively supported by the fact that the needs served by the justice system--deterrence, retributive justice, and even compensation-tend to
lessen over time. Similarly, the economic logic of loss-shifting to manufacturers and their insurers diminishes with time, not only with respect to the
goal of efficiently deterring wrongdoing but also because manufacturers and
their insurers can organize their resources more efficiently if they have some
reasonable basis for estimating their exposure to liability for past occurrences.
Finally, the equities of providing judicial remedies to persons who have long
neglected to use them-who have "sat upon their rights"-weaken as the
years progress. In short, after some period of time, in fairness to potential
defendants and in recognition of the limits of the courts, victims of wrongdoing who have long ignored 2their rights can fairly be required to accept their
bygone losses as their own. 1
2. Types of Time Limitation Statutes
As further explained below, time limitation statutes come in a variety of
forms. The two basic types of time limitation statutes are statutes of limita120. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980):
The process of discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate
facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh. Thus in
the judgment of most legislatures and courts, there comes a point at which
the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to
impair the accuracy of the factfinding process or to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred without respect to whether it
is meritorious.
Id. at 487.
121. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002).
See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 1177 (1950):
The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one
of fairness to the defendant. There comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of
ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when
"evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
Id. at 1185 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)) (footnotes omitted).
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tions and statutes of repose. While both forms of statute cut off a defendant's
products liability exposure after a period of time, they operate quite differently. The time periods of statutes of limitations are shorter-from as short as
1 year to as long as 6 years, depending on the jurisdiction-than those of
statutes of repose, which run from 5 or 6 years, in a few jurisdictions, to as
long as 18 or 20 years, in others. But there are a number of other important
differences between these two types of time limitation statutes. For example,
statutes of limitations begin to run at the time an injury occurs or is discovered (actually or constructively), whereas statutes of repose generally begin to
run when a product is sold; statutes of limitations normally may be delayed or
"tolled" by certain equitable circumstances, such as a plaintiffs infancy or
failure to discover an injury, whereas statutes of repose ordinarily may not; a
number of other important
differences distinguish the two basic forms of time
22
limitation statutes. 1
Statutes of limitations come in various forms. All states have statutes of
limitations applicable to personal injury torts, and separate statutes of limitations for wrongful death. In the absence of a more specific statute, such as a
products liability statute of limitations, 123 these general statutes of limitations
govern products liability claims for both negligence and strict liability in tort.
In addition, most states have statutes of limitations in their commercial codes
applicable to warranty claims. An increasing number of states, now a slight
majority, have special statutes of limitations applicable specifically to products liability claims.
Statutes of repose also come in a number of forms. The most basic form
of repose statute pertains to products liability claims generally, but some such
statutes make exception for particular types of products, such as asbestos. A
quite different form of repose statute, called a "useful-life" statute, bars a
plaintiff's claim at the expiration of the product's useful-life rather than after
a set period of time. In addition, some states apply repose statutes governing
improvements to realty to cases involving products attached to land, such as
large grain silos or overhead cranes. Finally, a federal statute of repose places
outer time limits on products liability claims against manufacturers of small
planes.

122. For example, as stated earlier, a statutes of limitations defense, being remedial, may be waived if not raised in a timely manner; but a statute of repose defense,
based on the termination of a plaintiff's rights, may not.
123. Specific statutes of limitations, such as those governing products liability
actions, normally take precedence over general statutes of limitations for personal
injuries or wrongful death. See, e.g., Harper v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 910,
912 n.2 (D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1980); Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 50 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Or. 2002) (en banc).

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 70

B. Statutes of Limitations
1. In General
a. Tort Law Statutes
Every jurisdiction has a statute of limitations governing claims for personal injuries or tortiously-caused harm, with time periods ranging from 1
year (in California, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee) to 6 years (in Maine
and North Dakota). The most common periods are 2 and 3 years. 24 Separate
statutes of limitations governing wrongful death and survival claims normally
are of the same duration as the injury statutes, but they are sometimes
shorter 12 and occasionally longer.' 2 6 Although a state may have a special
statute of limitations for fraud or tortious misrepresentation, the statute of
limitations governing personal injuries, wrongful death, or tortious misconduct may apply when the misconduct results in personal injury or death because the defendant's misrepresentation is "wrongful" or "tortious" behavior
resulting in personal injury or death. 12 7 And if the gist or gravamen of a products liability claim is really negligence or strict liability in tort for selling a
defective product, a court may not allow2 a plaintiff to circumvent a shorter
8
personal injury statute by alleging fraud.1
Traditionally, tort law claims begin to run when the claim "accrues,"
which is when the tort is complete because all of its elements have occurred.
The last element in a tort is the plaintiff's damage-harm that is proximately
124. Time periods for and citations to each jurisdiction's statute of limitations for
personal injuries are collected in Chart of Negligence Statutes of Limitations, Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3210. For limitations applicable to strict products liability in tort,
see Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Products Liability: What Statute of Limitations
Governs Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 91 A.L.R.3D 455 (1979).
125. See D.C. (injuries-3 years, death-I year); Florida (injuries-4 years,
death-2 years); Maine (injuries-6 years, death-2 years); Missouri (injuries-5
years, death-3 years); Nebraska (injuries-4 years, death-2 years); N.C. (injuries3 years, death-2 years); Utah (injuries-4 years, death-2 years); Wyoming (same).
Time periods for and citations to each jurisdiction's statute of limitations for wrongful
death are collected in Chart of Wrongful Death Statutes, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
3240.
126. See Minn. (injuries-2 years, death-3 years); N.H. (injuries-3 years,
death-6 years); Or. (injuries-2 years, death-3 years). Chart of Negligence Statutes of Limitations, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3210; Chart of Wrongful Death Statutes, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3240.
127. See, e.g., Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 226 n.2
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (allergic reaction to latex gloves; applying I-year personal injury
statute rather than 3-year fraud statute).
128. See, e.g., Larkins v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., No. CV-98-4960, 1999 WL
360204, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 1999) (side effects from drug; fraud claim incidental to negligence and strict liability claims).
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caused by the defendant's breach of duty. For this reason, the traditional rule
was that a tort law statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff
is injured. 129 A number of limitations statutes, even special products liability
statutes, still are phrased in terms of when the tort or products liability cause
of action arises or accrues, 130 and some actually specify that the statutory
period begins when the damage occurs. However, a majority of states now
have jettisoned the traditional accrual rule based on the time of injury, in favor of the discovery rule discussed below.
b. Warranty Law Statutes
State commercial law statutes contain statutes of limitations for warranty claims, based on Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725(1), Statute of
Limitations in Contracts for Sale. 132 In the absence of other agreement, this
section specifies a 4-year limitation period 133 for Article 2 breach of warranty
claims. 134 This provision is quite specific, and it would seem that courts
would be bound to apply this statutory period-which often is longer than the
jurisdiction's limitation period for torts-to products liability claims brought
in warranty. Duly considering themselves so bound, many courts apply the
129. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, § 30; Woods, supra note 112, § 4.
130. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-107 (1997) (products liability claims,
except in warranty, 2 years after claim arises); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(3) (Michie
2004) (products liability claims, 2 years after claim accrues); IND. CODE ANN. § 3420-3-1 (West 1999) (products liability claims, 2 years after claim accrues); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(13) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (products liability
claims, 3 years after claim accrues).
131. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(a)(1) (1975 & Supp. 2004) (all products
liability actions must be brought within 1 year of time of injury, death, or property
damage); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-103 (Michie 1999) (same-3 years); NEB. REV.
STAT. 25-224(1) (1995) (products liability claims-4 years after death, injury or other
damage); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(2)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2004) (products liability
claims-2 years after injury, death, or property damage); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-

103(a) (2000) (products liability claims--6 years after injury, death, or property damage).
132. See I BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES ch. 11 (2d. ed. 2002); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9 (5th ed. 2000); David J. Marchitelli, Annotation,
Causes of Action Governed by Limitations Period in UCC §72-725, 49 A.L.R.5TH 1

(1997).
133. Except in Oklahoma (5 years), Mississippi (6 years), South Carolina (6
years), Wisconsin (6 years), and Rhode Island (10 years). Chart of ContractsStatutes
of Limitations, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3220.
134. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977) provides: "An action for breach of any contract for
sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By

the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than
one year but may not extend it."
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Article 2 limitations provision to products liability claims brought in warranty. 135 But a number of courts, sometimes drawing on the warranty law
derivations of the doctrine of strict products liability in tort, reason that modem products liability actions for personal injuries (and death) sound more
properly in tort than in warranty.13 6 So flouting the legislature's prerogative to
37
define warranty statutes of limitations however it may choose,' these courts
to warranty as
thus have held that the tort law statutes of limitations apply
38
well as tort claims in ordinary products liability actions.'
Section 2-725(2) of the Code provides that the statute of limitations on
breach of warranty claims under Article 2 "accrues" when the breach occurs,
which generally is when the product is "tendered for delivery" unless the
seller has explicitly extended the warranty to future performance:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such peraccrues when the breach is or should
formance the cause of1action
39
discovered.
been
have

135. See, e.g., Hughes v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 667, 67475 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Strange v. Keiper Recaro Seating, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 408, 410
(D. Del. 2000), affd, 281 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2001). See generally 4 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.03[4][a][iv] (noting that a majority of courts apply §
2-725 to all breach of warranty actions).
136. Courts that ignore the legislature in this respect struggle to find a convincing
rationale for this imperious behavior, often attempting to justify their decisions by
drawing upon such dubious factors as the nature of the injury (if the injuries are tortlike, then the tort-law statute is supposedly appropriate) and whether the parties are in
privity of contract (if not, then the tort-law statute may be applied). Neither of these
rationales is sound. See I CLARK & SMrrH, supra note 132, §§ 11: 14-16.
137. See id. § 11.17, at 11-99 (characterizing a court's ignoring of UCC § 2-725
as "statutory destruction"). "In all cases the court should invoke the statute of limitations applicable to the cause of action." Id.
138. See, e.g., Fritchie v. Alumax, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 662, 671-72 (D. Neb. 1996);
Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1991) (state's 2-year tort law statute barred plaintiffs breach of warranty claim for personal injuries brought within 4
years of product's delivery). See generally 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 132, §
11:15, at 11 -94 to 11-95 ("Unfortunately, some courts are willing to ignore the plain
language of Section 2-725 when personal injury is sought under a warranty banner,
thus fuzzing the line between tort and warranty.").
139. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1977). See the nonuniform variations in Alabama and
Maine, where claims for personal injury accrue when the injury occurs; in South
Carolina, which substitutes the discovery rule.
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This means that the 4-year statute of limitations on warranty claims
normally begins to run when the seller tenders delivery to a buyer-which
usually is when the buyer first takes delivery of a product-whether or not
the buyer or other plaintiff has reason to know at that time that the product is
unmerchantable or an express warranty is false. In other words, the Code
explicitly rejects the discovery rule. However, as with the 4-year time period
in § 2-725(1), courts applying § 2-725(2) to personal injury cases sometimes
ignore its explicit language and apply the discovery rule to warranty actions
involving personal injuries.140
Section 2-725(2) contains some ambiguous wrinkles. First is the issue
concerning a product's "shelf-life," a problem which results when a manufacturer tenders delivery of a product to a retailer who places it on a shelf for
three years before selling it and tendering delivery to a buyer. If the product
malfunctions and injures the buyer two years thereafter (5 years after the
manufacturer tendered delivery to the retailer, but only 2 years after the retailer tendered delivery to the injured purchaser) and if the injured buyer
thereupon sues the manufacturer for breach of warranty, a court will have to
determine which tender of delivery started the 4-year time limitations clock
ticking under § 2-725(2). On this point the courts disagree, some ruling that
the period begins to run on the manufacturer's tender of delivery' 4 ' in order
to promote commercial certainty, others holding that the period begins only
when delivery by somebody is tendered to the buyer 142 in order to spread the
risk of loss and allow an injured plaintiff at least some chance to bring an
action for breach of warranty. 143
A second interpretative wrinkle in § 2-725(2) concerns the question of
when a seller's warranty "extends to future performance," in which event the
4-year time period does not begin to run until the plaintiff does or should
discover the breach of warranty, (normally the time of injury). Because the
discovery-rule exception applies only to warranties that "explicitly" extend to
future performance, the courts are quite clear in holding that this exception
cannot logically apply to implied warranties. 144 And while express warranties
140. See infra Section III.B.2.b. for discussion of discovery rule.
141. See, e.g., Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 477 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1985) (42 decision).
142. See, e.g., Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa.
1978). For a discussion of this case, see Michael B. Metzger, Comment, Consumer
Suits Against Manufacturers and the Code's Statute of Limitations: Her Majesty's
Edict, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 221 (1979).

143. This latter approach "appears correct." I CLARK & SMITH, supra note 132, §
11:7, at 11-57. See Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983) (endorsing this approach), af'd,477 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1985).
144. See I CLARK & SMITH, supra note 132, § 11:5, at 11-51 ("The courts have
consistently ruled that implied warranties of merchantability and fitness do not explicitly extend to future performance."). See, e.g., Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Minnesota law) (implied warran-
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would in a sense seem always to extend to a product's future performance,
most courts have been reluctant to rule that normal express warranties "explicitly" so extend. 45 Consequently, unless an express warranty (as distinguished from a remedy, such as repair or replacement)1 46 provides that it will
last for a specified period of time, 47 most courts hold that such a warranty
does not extend to future performance, which means that the 4-year limitations period begins to8 run when delivery is tendered rather than when plaintiff
discovers the harm.14
c. Products Liability Statutes
An increasing majority of states have enacted special statutes of limitations, usually as part of a larger products liability reform act, that specifically
govern products liability claims. 149 Because they apply specially to products
liability claims, such provisions take precedence over more general statutes of
limitations covering torts, personal injuries, and wrongful death. 150 Products
ties cannot extend to future performance); Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 652 N.W.2d
806 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
145. See 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 132, § 11:4 (noting that the great bulk of
cases refuse to find that warranties extend to future performance).
146. See, e.g., Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883
(Ala. 1989) ("repair-or-replacement" warranty for 36,000 miles or 36 months addresses remedy, not warranty, and so does not explicitly extend to future performance). But see Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 287 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying Mississippi law) (limitations period based on "repair or replace" provision
did not begin to run until the promise to repair or replace failed of its essential purpose); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (promise to repair defects that occur within 36,000 miles or 36 months explicitly extends to future performance; discovery rule applied).
147. Such as a two-year limited express warranty, or a limited automotive warranty for the lesser of 3 years or 36,000 miles.
148. See, e.g., Snyder v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 955, 958-59 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (boat warranted to be "unsinkable"); Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,
649 N.W.2d 783, 791-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (reference in boat manual to "years
of trouble free boating" and "family fun for many years to come" did not create a
warranty of future performance); Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 806, 814
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (statement that "all exterior wood is deep-treated to permanently
protect against rot and decay" did not create warranty of future performance). But see
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 873, 880-81 (8th Cir.
2000) (applying Minnesota law) (warranty may extend to future performance even if
length of coverage is imprecise; warranty that product would last as long as other
manufacturers' products and longer than similar product that plaintiff already owned
created jury issue on whether warranty of future performance was created).
149. The statutes are listed and described in Chart of Negligence Statutes of Limitations, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3210.
150. See, e.g., Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 50 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Or. 2002)
(applying ordinary canon of statutory construction, held 2-year products liability
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liability statutes of limitations typically apply to all "products liability
claims," including claims for breach of warranty and wrongful death.1 5' Yet,
because of Article 2's special statute of limitations for warranty claims in
UCC § 2-725, it is unclear whether a legislature's enactment of a statute of
limitations for "products liability claims" captures warranty claims under that
umbrella. Many products liability statutes cure this ambiguity by specifying
the types of claims included, as by expressly including or excluding breach of
warranty and possibly other types of claims, such as those for wrongful death.
Colorado's products liability statute, for example, specifies that all products
liability actions for personal injury or death, other than in warranty, must be
brought within two years after a claim for relief arises.' 52 Some special prod53
ucts liability statutes combine statutes of limitations with statutes of repose.'
2. Stopping the Clock
Certain conduct by a defendant, or a plaintiffs status or reasonable ignorance of an injury or a products liability claim, may "toll"-stop the running of-the statute of limitations clock. Some statutes explicitly so provide,
and courts sometimes apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to achieve the
same result.' 54 Moreover, a statute of limitations clock may be delayed until
the plaintiffs final exposure to a toxic substance; and long after the plaintiff
first suffers an initial injury from such a substance, the limitations clock may
begin to run anew if the plaintiff subsequently suffers another separate type of
harm.
a. Tolling
The running of a statutory limitations period may be delayed on account
of certain wrongful conduct by a defendant. If a defendant fraudulently prevents a plaintiff from learning that he or she has a products liability claim
against the defendant, a court may apply the equitable doctrine of tolling to
delay a statute of limitations from running until the plaintiff does or should

statute of limitations, being more specific, trumps 3-year wrongful death statute). But
see Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 1076 (Utah 2002) (4-year statute of limitations for negligence actions, and not 2-year statute of limitations for products liability
actions, governed claim that manufacturer negligently installed and serviced its machine).
151. See, e.g., ARK. REv. STAT. § 16-116-103 (Michie 1999) (3 years-all prod-

ucts liability actions or injury, death, or damage); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(1)
(1995) (4 years-all products liability actions for injury, death, or damage).
152. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106(1) (1997).

153. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(a) (1991 & Supp. 2004).
154. See 2 CORMAN, supra note 110, at chs. 8-10; 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 29, § 26.07.
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discover the existence of the claim.'" For a defendant's fraudulent concealment to be sufficient to toll a limitations statute, the defendant must act affirmatively to hide facts necessary to the plaintiff's claim and thereby prevent
the plaintiff from discovering its existence. 1 6 Silence alone, including a failure to warn of a known defect, is insufficient.15 7 As a predicate for tolling on

the basis of fraudulent concealment, most jurisdictions require that the plaintiff prove the defendant's intent to deceive the plaintiff.15 8 Even in the absence of an intent to deceive, however, a defendant whose misrepresentation
is relied upon by a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from relying on a statute of limitations.159
By statute and case law, most states toll statutes of limitations for claims

by plaintiffs whose disabilities interfere with a fair opportunity to pursue a
legal claim. Most states, but not all, also toll statutes of limitations for a mi-

nor's claims until he or she reaches the age of majority.' 6 In addition, at least
when the defendant's product causes a person to become mentally incompetent, a plaintiff's incompetency may toll the statute of limitations.1 6 Further,

155. See 2 CORMAN, supra note 110, § 9.7.2, at 67 ("Fraudulent concealment
involves the use of artifice to prevent inquiry or investigation and to mislead or hinder
the acquisition of information that would disclose a right of action. Postponing the
accrual of the cause of action is based on the concealing party's wrongdoing and the
plaintiffs blameless ignorance of the cause of action."). See generally Richard L.
Marcus, FraudulentConcealment in FederalCourt: Toward a More DisparateStandard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829 (1983).
156. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Dyncorp., Inc., 187 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying
Arizona law) (limitations statute not tolled where no allegation of positive act by
defendant); Curry v. A. H. Robins Co., 775 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois
law); Curlee v. Mock Enter., Inc., 327 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). See also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 572 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (no tolling where claim of fraudulent concealment was mere conjecture). See
generally 2 CORMAN, supra note 110, § 9.7.
157. See, e.g., Cazalas v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 435 So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala.
1983); Martin v. Arthur, 3 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. 1999); Curlee, 327 S.E.2d at 741.
158. See, e.g., Curry, 775 F.2d at 217-18. See generally CORMAN, supra note I 10,
§ 9.7.1, at 61.
159. See, e.g., Northwestern Pub. Serv. v. Union Carbide Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1171 (D. S.D. 2000); Anane v. Pettibone Corp., 560 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
160. See, e.g., Mueller v. Parke Davis, 599 A.2d 950, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (applying New Jersey and Virginia law, both of which tolled statute for
plaintiffs infancy, rather than that of Connecticut, which did not); Smith v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 643 P.2d 576, 577 (Mont. 1982); Macku v. Drackett Prods. Co., 343
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1984). In contrast with a statute of limitations, a plaintiff's minority will not toll a statute of repose. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648
N.W.2d 87, 94-95 (Iowa 2002).
161. See, e.g., Pardy v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Ill. 1982) (reviewing
the law nationally). But see Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000)
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for the tolling of claims by persons on active duty in the
federal law provides
162
armed services.

Various jurisdictions toll statutes of limitations in a miscellany of other
situations. Statutes in some states protect retailers and other nonmanufacturing defendants from strict liability unless, among other things, the manufac163
turer is (or is likely to become) insolvent. In a state with such a statute, if a
plaintiff after diligent investigation chooses not to join a nonmanufacturing
defendant because the manufacturer (or its successor) reasonably appears
likely to remain solvent, a court may toll the statute of limitations against the
nonmanufacturing seller until the plaintiff should discover the manufacturer's
insolvency.164 And, while a class action is pending certification, most courts
toll the statute of limitations provisionally, in case the petition fails, for the
individual claims of persons who would have been class members had the
class action been approved. 165

(statute not tolled for plaintiff who was on nearly constant pain medication in hospital
after accident and often did not know where she was).
162. See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178
(1940) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501-596 (2000)).
163. See OWEN, supra note 1, § 15.2.
164. See, e.g., Crego v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., No. 16515, 1998 WL
80240 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1998); Braswell v. AC & S, Inc., 105 S.W.3d 587
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (statute which precluded strict liability in tort claim against
seller unless manufacturer is insolvent tolled statute of limitations until manufacturer

filed for bankruptcy). See generally 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, §
26.07[5].
165. See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-51 (1974); In
re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 163, 166-67 (E.D. Tex.
1997); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 173 F.R.D. 185 (E.D. Tex.
1997) (mem.) (refusing to vacate order in preceding Norplant case); Vaccariello v.
Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio 2002) (filing of class action in
Ohio or federal court system tolls statute of limitations as to all asserted members of
class who would have been parties had suit been permitted to continue as class action;
discussing cases on cross-jurisdictional tolling based on class action filings); Maestas
v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., No. 02AOI-9804-CV-00099, 1999 WL 74212, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999) (bone screw litigation), aff'd, 33 S.W.3d 805 (Tenn.
2000). But see Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to toll
statute during DES putative class action, where variance among individual claims
made class certification very unlikely). But a suspension of the statute of limitations
in such litigation does not revive claims on which the statute already has run. See
Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 289 F.3d 402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying
Kentucky Law) (6-month suspension of statutes of limitations and repose designated
in opt-out form accompanying settlement notifications in silicone breast implant class
action). See generally 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.07[6].
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b. The Discovery Rule
In products liability actions involving toxic substances (such as asbestos, dangerous drugs, other toxic chemicals) and medical devices implanted in
the human body, a plaintiff may have no way to know that he or she has suffered injury until long after it first occurs. For example, the incubation period
for mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer resulting from inhaling asbestos
dust, may be as long as 40 years. 166 If a statute of limitations begins to run on
a plaintiffs claim for harm from a toxic substance at the time the plaintiff
first suffers harm, the conventional accrual point for tort law claims as discussed above, then the limitations statute would bar the legal rights of many
persons injured by toxic substances before they even knew that they were
injured. Applying the traditional accrual rule to cases of this type, as courts
used to do, snuffed out the products liability rights of many consumers and
workers to recover for grievous injuries caused by the most insidious kinds of
67
defective products. 1
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s,16 8 several courts began to remedy
this problem by extending the "discovery rule" from medical malpractice
litigation, where it had been incubating, 169 to products liability litigation. 7 °
Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues not when the plaintiff is
injured but when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, pertinent facts about the injury. Today, courts in the
vast majority of jurisdictions apply the discovery rule to products liability
cases, 171 and some states have codified the rule, either for tort actions gener166. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., 998 P.2d 403, 407 (Cal. 2000) (noting 3040 year latency period for mesothelioma).
167. See, e.g., Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-06 (Va.
1981).
168. A progenitor case was Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (FELA compensation claim for silicosis).
169. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, § 30.
170. Early cases include R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th
Cir. 1963) (applying Louisiana law); Breaux v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 F. Supp.
668 (E.D. La. 1967); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580
S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 176 (N.H. 1977)
("[W]e do not think the drug company can reasonably expect to be immune to suit
before its customer has a fair opportunity to discover the company's tortious conduct."); Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). See generally
Woods, supra note 112.
171. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 983 (S.D. Ind.
2002) (applying California and Arizona law) (finding for plaintiffs); Russo v. Cabot
Corp., No. Civ.A.O1CV2613, 2002 WL 1833348 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2002) (mem.)
(finding for defendants), rev'd sub nom., Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117 (3d
Cir. 2003); Degussa Corp. V. Mullens, 744 N.E.2d 407 (Ind. 2001). See generally 4
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.04[2][a] ("It has become the nearunanimous rule."). Some courts apply the discovery rule in products liability actions
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ally... or for products liability actions in particular. 173 Some courts and statutes specify that the discovery rule, or some particular version of it, applies to
or illnesses from toxic substances, cases where the
cases involving injuries
174
rule is needed most.
Courts and legislatures are widely split on precisely what type of facts a
plaintiff must discover to trigger a limitations statute and start the clock ticking. Some jurisdictions start the clock when the plaintiff leams or should be
75
aware that he or she is ill or injured, while others hold that the clock does

on a case-by-case basis, while others hold that their states' various statutes of limitation do not allow a discovery rule. See Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 569
S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 2002) (discovery rule does not apply to 4-year statute for damage to
realty); Hoffman v. Orthopedic Sys., Inc., 765 N.E.2d 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (caseby-case basis); Griffith v. Blatt, 51 P.3d 1256 (Or. 2002) (discovery rule does not
apply to 2-year products liability statute of limitations).
172. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-108(1) (1997), applied to toxic substance
products liability case in Salazar v. American Sterilizer Co., 5 P.3d 357 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. 2005), similarly applied in
Grillo v. Speedrite Prods., Inc., 532 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000).
173. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(a) (1991 & Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT.
ch. 95.031(2)(b) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.060 (West 1992).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c(2) (McKinney 2003) (discovery rule applies to
harm "caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of
substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property"); Carter
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2000) (discovery rule
applies to "creeping diseases" such as lung cancer); Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., 476
N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985) (discovery rule adopted for use in limited context of claims of
injuries from "protracted exposure to a foreign substance"-Dalkon Shield IUD). See
also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.907 (2003) (claims for asbestos injuries to be brought
within 2 years of when injuries were or should have been discovered, in contrast to 2years from date of injury for normal products liability claims under Oregon Revised
Statute Section 30.905).
175. See, e.g., Adams v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying Idaho law) (asbestos; when asbestosis or other injury was "objectively ascertainable"); Wiggins v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-7543,
1999 WL 94615 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1999) (broken guide wire in heart; statute began to
run when plaintiff learned or reasonably should have learned of objective and ascertainable injury); Bendix Corp. v. Stagg, 486 A.2d 1150 (Del. 1984) (asbestosis; when
harmful effect was manifested, physically ascertainable); Condon v. A. H. Robins
Co., 349 N.W.2d 622 (Neb. 1984) (Dalkon Shield; when harmful effect was reasonably discovered); Wetherill v. Eli Lilly & Co., 678 N.E.2d 474 (N.Y. 1997) (DES;
discovery of primary condition), superseded by statute as stated in, Germantown
Central School Dist. v. Clark, Clark, Millis & Gilson, 743 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002); Cavanagh v. Abbott Labs., 496 A.2d 154 (Vt. 1985) (DES; when vaginal
cancer was discovered). Statutes to this effect include CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52577a(a); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-12.2 (Michie
2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512(4) (2002).
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not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and its cause. 176
Even these latter courts cannot agree on how specific the plaintiff's discovery
of "cause" must be. Some courts start the clock only when the plaintiff dis77
covers a causal connection between the injury and a particular product;'
others start the clock only when the plaintiff discovers the identity of the
party responsible for causing the injury (the defendant); 178 and some require
that the plaintiff must discover the defendant's wrongdoing-that he or she
has a cause of action, or at least be put on notice of that reasonable possibility. 179 One reasonable way to formulate a discovery rule, capturing the es176. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 24 FED App. 533 (6th Cir. 2001)
(applying Kentucky Law) (prescription drug Parlodel; statute not triggered until plaintiff has reasonable opportunity to discover causal relationship between drug and
stroke); Brown v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 820 A.2d 362 (Del. 2003) (fungicide; plaintiff knew or should have known both of the injury and that injury may have
been caused by the defendant's tortious conduct); Carter v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2000) (statute does not begin to run on latent
injury for "creeping disease," like lung cancer from smoking, until plaintiff is on
notice of causal connection between exposure to product and an injury); Dorman v.
Osmose, Inc., 782 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (chromated copper arsenate used
in treating wood; plaintiff must know or should have known both of his injury and
that it was caused by product or acts of another); Baldwin v. Badger Mining Corp.,
663 N.W.2d 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (allegedly defective respirator masks; plaintiff
must know or should have known both of his injury and that injury probably was
caused by defendant's product or conduct). See generally 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, §§ 26.04[41[b], [f] (listing, as following this rule, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Utah).
177. See, e.g., Stewart v. Philip Morris, Inc., 205 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Arkansas law) (connection between cigarette smoking and breathing and
coughing problems); Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 557 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1990) (connection between DES and cancer).
178. See, e.g., Michals v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 289 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2002)
(applying Kentucky law) (breast implants; plaintiff must know or should have known
that she has been wronged and by whom wrong has been committed). See generally 4
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 2 6.0 4 [4][g] (listing, as following this rule,
Arizona, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Washington, and West
Virginia).
179. See, e.g., Welch v. Celotex Corp. 951 F.2d 1235 (11 th Cir. 1992) (applying
Georgia law) (plaintiff must discover both injury and its causal connection to wrongful conduct); Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 227 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) ("'Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that
someone has done something wrong to her."') (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751
P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1988) (en banc)). See generally 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 29, § 26.04[4][h] (listing, as following this rule, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Vermont). At least South Carolina's rule is by statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535
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sence of what many courts have ruled, is to hold a statute triggered when an
injured person acquires facts reasonably suggesting that a likely cause of the
180
been defective.
injury was a particular product that plausibly may have
Knowledge of this type should put most people on8notice that they should see
remedy.'1
a lawyer to determine if they have a legal
As seen above, the Uniform Commercial Code is perfectly clear in stating that claims for breach of warranty under the Code accrue on breach, defined as when tender of delivery occurs, "regardless of the aggrieved party's
82
It is hard to imagine how the Code's
lack of knowledge of the breach.'
drafters could have been any more explicit in rejecting the discovery rule.
Yet, for whatever reason,' 3 some courts have ignored the clear language and
liability claims for breach of warranty
applied the discovery rule to products
18 4
death.
or
injury
personal
involving
c. Splitting Claims-The "Single-Action" vs. "Separate-Injury" Rules
A special statute of limitations issue arises when a single defective condition in a product harms a person in two or more separate ways at different
times. A problematic question in such cases is when the statute of limitations
should begin to run on the second injury--at the time the plaintiff discovered
the first injury, or at the time he or she discovers the second. Normally, be(Law. Co-op. 2005), applied in Grillo v. Speedrite Prods., Inc., 532 S.E.2d 1, 3-6
(S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (factual question whether circumstances would have put plaintiff
on notice that some claim against another party might exist).
180. See, e.g., Dennis v. ICL, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1997) (focus is on
plaintiff's knowledge of facts, not discovery of applicable legal theories); Jolly v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (DES; "[o]nce the plaintiff
has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide
whether to file suit or sit on her rights"). For a case purporting to reject "inquiry notice" as the trigger for the discovery rule, see Salazar v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 5 P.3d
357, 363 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
181. Demanding any greater confidence in the existence of a products liability
claim might require the plaintiff to have the expertise of a reader of this article, a
result which would be monstrously unfair to normal plaintiffs.
182. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (amended in 2003).
183. For example, some courts read U.C.C. § 2-725(2) as applying only to buyers
rather than third parties. See, e.g., Salvador v. At. Steel Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (2- year tort statute, not U.C.C. § 2-725, applicable to all third
takes a very strained
party personal injury actions, tort and warranty, because "[i]t
reading of Section 2-725 to conclude that it was ever meant to apply to persons other
than the contracting parties"), aff'd, 424 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1981). This approach itself
seems rather strained. However, in a state with a special statute of limitations for
products liability claims, a court might reasonably conclude that a products liability
statute of limitations trumps the Article 2 statute of limitations because the former is
more specific than the latter.
184. See I CLARK& SMITH, supra note 132, § 11.15.

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

cause each breach of duty by a defendant is thought to generate a single, indivisible cause of action, a plaintiff is required to seek all damages caused
thereby at the time the complaint is filed; thereafter, the plaintiff is precluded
from suing the defendant again for damages arising from the same transaction.185 So, if the operator of a defective punch press recovers damages for
resulting injuries to his hand and arm in an action against the manufacturer,
he cannot later maintain a second action against the manufacturer for injuries
from the same accident that he subsequently discovers in his back. Underlying res judicata, this principle of claim preclusion is sometimes called the
86
single-action rule, or the rule against claim-splitting. 1
Although the claim-splitting issue can arise in traumatic injury cases,
such as the punch press situation just discussed, it most frequently and
acutely arises in cases involving injuries and illnesses from toxic substances
like asbestos. Two decades after exposure,' 87 an asbestos worker may suffer
asbestosis (or pleural thickening) for which damages may be available against
the asbestos supplier, perhaps for failing to warn of the risk. Another one or
two decades later,188 long after the initial asbestosis claim is resolved, the
very same worker may contract a deadly form of lung cancer, mesothelioma.
In this context, some courts have applied the single-action rule to bar the second claim, holding that the statute of limitations on all claims runs from the
first injury or its discovery. 1 9 However, "[g]iven the harshness of the single185. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone

Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical

Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (2002):
In most tort cases, the law provides a plaintiff one indivisible cause of action for all damages arising from a defendant's breach of duty. This hoary
rule against splitting a cause of action is designed to prevent vexatious and
repetitive litigation of a single underlying claim when plaintiff's injuries
eventually result in damages that are more serious than originally contemplated. [Despite the real problem of proof and risks of undercompensation
facing injured plaintiffs,] the specter of repetitive litigation and the lack of
finality to litigation present unacceptable costs to the legal system. Thus,
the single-action rule is deeply embedded in the jurisprudence of this
country.
186. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.8 (5th ed. 2001).
187. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., 998 P.2d 403, 407 (Cal. 2000) (noting
the 20-year average latency period of asbestosis).
188. See id. (noting the 30- to 40-year average latency period of mesothelioma).
189. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("a plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seeking damages for some
of his injuries in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another"). Compare
Kemp v. G.D. Searle & Co., 103 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Mississippi law)
(IUD caused pelvic inflammatory disease that eventually led to infertility; held, statute ran from discovery of PID 8 years prior to diagnosis of scarred fallopian tubes that
caused plaintiff's infertility). In smoking cases, courts have likewise applied the "first
injury" rule, holding that the alleged addiction to cigarettes is the injury which trig-
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action rule,..., the overwhelming majority of courts abandoned the singleaction rule and now allow separate causes of action later, when a plaintiff
90
actually develops asbestosis, lung cancer, or mesothelioma."' Thus, in place
of the old single-action rule, courts in latent or "creeping" disease cases are
rapidly switching over to a converse doctrine-the separate-injury or twodisease rule-which starts the limitations clock ticking on separate and dis91
tinct diseases at the time of their discovery.'

C. Statutes of Repose
1. Origin
The discovery rule, which courts and legislatures widely adopted in
products liability litigation in the 1970s and 1980s, protects injury victims
from losing their claims before they know that they have been harmed or that
they may have a means of legal redress. But by delaying the running of statutes of limitations, sometimes for many years past the time of injury (and
gers the statute of limitations on the subsequently developed illnesses. See Soliman v.
Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying California law) (smoker's
claims accrued when he knew or should have known that smoking is addictive; "[t]he
injury he should have known about first is the one that starts the statute of limitations"); Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101, 114 (Ala.
2003) ("Artful pleading such as is presented here, where Spain disavows seeking a
recovery for all pre-cancer injuries, should not defeat the operation of the first-injury
rule.").
190. Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, supra note 185, at 821 (citing cases).
191. The fountainhead case was Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d
I 11, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (diagnosis of asbestosis did not trigger limitations statute for other injuries from same exposure to asbestos). See also Potts v. Celotex
Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tenn. 1990) (same; good summary of rationales). For
examples of recent cases, see Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., 998 P.2d 403, 413-15 (Cal.
2000) (use of single-action rule in asbestos cases precluded by state statute); Parks v.
A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 754 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (asbestos claim did not
trigger statute of limitations for cancer claim since they are separate diseases); Carroll
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 37 S.W.3d 699, 700, 703 (Ky. 2000) (although
Kentucky has never been a "two disease" state, a cancer claim accrues on date of its
diagnosis, not date of asbestosis diagnosis, since the diseases are separate and distinct); Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2000) ("[T]he
single action rule is a catch-22 for victims of multiple latent diseases [because] [a]
plaintiff who sues for asbestosis is precluded from any recovery for a later-developing
lethal mesothelioma. But the discovery rule would preclude a plaintiff with asbestosis
from waiting to see if an asbestosis-related cancer later develops .... "); Sopha v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Wis. 1999) ("The diagnosis
of a malignant asbestos-related condition creates a new cause of action and the statute
of limitations governing the malignant asbestos-related condition begins when the
claimant discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, the malignant asbestos-related condition.").
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long after the product was manufactured), the discovery rule undermines the
central purpose of limitations statutes. It will be recalled that limitations statutes are designed to provide a point in time after which both actors and courts
can avoid having to address claims for injuries allegedly caused by actors and
suffered by victims many years in the past. So, while promoting fairness for
injured plaintiffs, the discovery rule promotes unfairness for manufacturers
and inconvenience for the courts.
In an attempt to reinstate some portion of the defendant-fairness objectives of limitations statutes in a world committed to the plaintiff-fairness objectives of the discovery rule, many state legislatures from the 1960s through
the early 1980s enacted statutes of "repose."' 92 A major pillar of the tort "reform" movement, these special limitations statutes addressed problems with
long-delayed claims by three particular groups disadvantaged by the discovery rule: doctors, who wanted an eventual end to the threat of malpractice
suits for medical accidents; architects, engineers, and contractors, who
wanted an end to potential liability for injuries from buildings and other structures that might last for centuries; 193 and manufacturers of products, who may
have to answer products liability claims for products manufactured many
194
decades in the past.
2. Distinguished from Statutes of Limitation
Like statutes of limitations, products liability and other statutes of repose terminate a plaintiffs right to bring a claim after a period of time;' 95 but
192. See, e.g., Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in
the ProductsLiability Reform Effort, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1689, 1697-1702.
193. 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supranote 29, § 26.05[5][a] n.78:
The pyramids of Egypt, the Colosseum in Rome, the Parthenon in Greece
are only now, at the end of the twentieth century, starting to succumb to
the ravages of time. Consequently, it would be easy to imagine ten-,
twenty-, fifty- or even one-hundred-year-old buildings and other structures as potential liability problems. So too are the products that are an integral part of them, such as elevators, furnaces, heavy machinery and the
like.
194. On statutes of repose in general, see, for example, Josephine Herring Hicks,
Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 627 (1985). On products liability statutes of repose, see 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, § 26.05; 4 HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 29, §§ 47:55-:64; Michael M.
Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 745
(1982); Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionalityof Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (1981); Statutes of Repose, Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 3100; Zitter, supra note 112, § 16 (products liability statutes of
repose).
195. Statutes of limitations and repose often are contrasted on the ground that a
limitations statute merely limits a plaintiff's right to seek a remedy for a defendant's
breach of duty, whereas a repose statute limits the duty itself. That is, the former
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statutes of repose are different in two principal respects. First, statutes of repose begin to run at a time certain:products liability statutes of this type typically run from the time the manufacturer first sells the product, and realty
improvement statutes normally run from when the structure is completed.
This aspect of repose statutes gives manufacturers much more confidence that
their potential liability eventually will stop some number of years after a
product has been manufactured and sold. Second, statutes of repose have a
much greater duration than statutes of limitations, varying in length from
state to state, from 5 or 6 years to as long as 10 or 12 or even 20 years. The
much longer periods within which a claim may be filed under statutes of repose reflect a deference to the discovery rule's objective of providing most
persons injured by most products with an opportunity to assert their claims
once they discover their injuries. While repose statutes bar some claims,
96
such
sometimes even before they are discovered or otherwise accrue,'
time
as
Moreover,
old.
quite
claims normally are infrequent and generally
the
weigh
must
one
sold,
and
made
are
marches on after particular products
aging
but
legitimate
making
from
plaintiffs
decreasing hardships of barring
claims against the increasing burdens on manufacturers and courts in responding to such claims long after the fact-a balance that at some point tips
in favor of terminating claims after a reasonable but arbitrary period of
allow for the kind of
time. 197 For this reason, repose statutes do not normally
98
limitations.
of
statutes
to
equitable tolling applied
3. Choice of Law
Differences between statutes of limitations and repose may affect the
choice of law.' 99 Limitations and repose statutes often are contrasted on the
ground that statutes of limitations are "procedural," because they merely limit
a plaintiffs right to seek a remedy for a defendant's breach of duty, whereas
statutes of repose are "substantive," because they limit the duty itself. Stated
merely limits the time for bringing a claim after it has accrued, whereas the latter
extinguishes the claim after a fixed period of time. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002) ("a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, not the right, whereas a statute of repose affects the right itself, extinguishing
existing rights or preventing rights from arising") (citation omitted); Martin, supra
note 194, at 749.
196. See, e.g., Albrecht, 648 N.W.2d at 91 (15-year statute of repose barred claim
before car accident involving minor plaintiff).
197. See Schwartz, supra note 112, at 842-51.
198. See, e.g., Albrecht, 648 N.W.2d 87 (no tolling for infancy). Cf Lantzy v.
Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 522 (Cal. 2003) (builder statute of repose not subject to
judicial doctrine of equitable tolling).
199. See, e.g., 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at ch. 25; 4 HURSH &
BAILEY, supra note 29, at ch. 46; LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, III ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW §§ 116-18 (5th ed. 2001); 2 OWEN ET AL., supranote 63, at ch. 30.
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another way, this traditional view characterizes statutes of limitation as procedural because they merely limit the time for bringing claims after they have
accrued, whereas statutes of repose are characterized as substantive because,
after a fixed period of time, they extinguish claims altogether. 200 This procedural/substantive distinction is important in states that adhere to traditional
conflict of laws principles and that lack an applicable borrowing statute. Traditionally, a forum state applied its own "procedural" statute of limitation
even if another state's law governed the parties' substantive rights. 20 1 Over
time, many state legislatures altered this traditional rule by enacting "borrowing statutes" which typically provide that the forum state's court will borrow
the statute of limitations of another state where the cause of action arose or
accrued, or where the defendant resided or was domiciled.20 2 Courts adhering
to the traditional procedural/substantive distinction which lack an applicable
borrowing statute are divided on several points: whether a statute of repose is
procedural or substantive; 2°3 whether the traditional conflict of laws rule applies to its or another state's statutes of repose; 2°4 and whether the forum state
is bound by the other state's characterization of its statute of repose. °5
200. See, e.g., Albrecht, 648 N.W.2d at 91 ("a statute of limitations affects only
the remedy, not the right, whereas a statute of repose affects the right itself, extinguishing existing rights or preventing rights from arising") (citation omitted); Martin,
supra note 194, at 749.
201. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (because statutes of
limitation are traditionally characterized as procedural, a state may apply its own
statute of limitation to a claim governed by another state's law without violating due
process or the full faith and credit clause).
202. See Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (applying California borrowing statute to hold that California lawsuit was
barred by Montana's realty statute of repose); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation,
Validity, Construction, and Application, in Nonstatutory PersonalInjury Actions, of
State Statute Providingfor Borrowing of Statute of Limitations of Another State, 41

A.L.R.4TH 1025 (1985) (borrowing statutes).
203. Compare Walls v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 906 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Oregon law) (repose statute is substantive) with Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
32 F.3d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (applying Connecticut law) (repose statute
is procedural).
204. See, e.g., Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying South Carolina law) (under lex loci delicti rule of forum state, substantive law
of place where accident occurred applied, including its statute of repose which barred
tort claim; but warranty claim could proceed according to forum state law under UCC
§ 1-105 "appropriate relation" test).
205. See, e.g., Baxter, 32 F.3d 48 (Oregon products liability statute of repose is
procedural and thus inapplicable in Connecticut lawsuit governed by Oregon's substantive law); Walls, 906 F.2d at 146 (Oregon products liability statute of repose is
substantive, and thus applicable in Mississippi lawsuit governed by Oregon substantive law, because Mississippi is bound to apply Oregon's view that its statute of repose is substantive); Etheredge v. Genie Indus., Inc., 632 So. 2d 1324 (Ala. 1994)
(North Carolina products liability statute of repose is procedural and thus inapplicable
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Characterizing statutes of repose as procedural or substantive is less important for choice of law purposes in jurisdictions that have adopted some
form of the modem "most significant relationship" or "governmental interests" tests. Under this approach, courts generally apply the statute of limitations or repose of the state where the injury occurred unless the place of the
injury is insignificant or another state has a greater interest in applying its
time bars. 20 6 For breach of warranty claims, the Uniform Commercial Code
contains a choice of law provision providing that the law of the forum "ap2 °7
This proplies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
vision is generally construed as employing a standard similar to the "most
significant relationship" test described above with one significant difference:

in Alabama lawsuit governed by North Carolina substantive law even though North
Carolina characterizes its statute of repose as substantive); Boudreau v. Baughman,
368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988) (Florida's 12-year products liability statute of repose, and
not North Carolina's 6-year products liability statute of repose, applied because both
statutes are substantive and the North Carolina lawsuit was governed by Florida's
substantive law); Terry v. Pullman Trailmobile, 376 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(North Carolina's 6-year products liability statute of repose did not apply to tort
claims brought in a North Carolina lawsuit governed by New York's substantive law).
206. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 288 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2002)
(applying New Jersey law) (Indiana law on the discovery rule applied and not New
Jersey law on the discovery rule where the injury occurred in Indiana and New Jersey
did not have a more significant relationship); Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d
514 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Indiana law) (Indiana's 10-year products liability statute of repose applied where injury occurred in Indiana and the place of the injury was
not insignificant); Jaurequi v. John Deere Co., 986 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Texas law) (Indiana's 10-year products liability statute of repose did not apply where
injury occurred outside Indiana and Indiana did not have more significant relationship); Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (Florida's
4-year statute of limitations, and not New Jersey's 2-year statute of limitations, applied where injury occurred in Florida and New Jersey did not have more significant
relationship); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(North Carolina's 6-year products liability statute of repose applied where injury
occurred in North Carolina and Michigan's only connection to lawsuit was that plaintiff moved there after injury); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1996)
(Georgia's 10-year products liability statute of repose did not apply even though injury occurred in Georgia because New Jersey's interest in deterring tortious conduct
by New Jersey manufacturers outweighed Georgia's interest in enforcing its statute of
repose); Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1999) (applying
Connecticut statute of repose to bar claim); Martin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
61 P.3d 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (Washington's 12-year useful life statute of
repose, and not Oregon's 8-year product liability statute of repose, applied where
injury occurred in Washington state and Oregon did not have a more significant relationship). Gantes is examined in EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §
17.70 (3d ed. 2000).
207. U.C.C. § 1-105(l) (amended 2001). See, e.g., Thornton, 886 F.2d at 89-90.

MISSOURI LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 70

the focus is20°on the place of contracting or manufacture rather than the place of
the injury.
4. Products Liability Statutes of Repose
There are two basic types of products liability statutes of repose, depending on how the statute defines the period of time before repose. The most
common type of statute, "time-certain" statutes, define the time period with
certainty as a particular number of years after the sale or purchase of the
product. Another form of statute, called a "useful-life" statute, measures the
time period variously, according to whatever a court or jury determines the

2 °9
particular product's useful, safe life to be. Presently, some fifteen states
have time-certain products liability statutes of repose in effect, and six
states 2 have some form of useful-life statute of repose.
The most fundamental issue regarding statutes of repose concerns their constitutionality,
discussed below.

a. Time-certain Statutes
The limitations periods of most products liability statutes of repose are
absolute, and a plaintiffs rights to sue are terminated after a set period of
time, ranging from 6 to15 years, but most typically 10 years after the manufacturer first sold the product.21 2 For example, Indiana's statute provides that
208. See Terry, 376 S.E.2d 47 (North Carolina's 6-year products liability statute
of repose did not apply to tort claims brought in a North Carolina lawsuit governed by
New York's substantive law but did apply to the breach of warranty claims because
the sale and distribution of the product occurred in North Carolina). For more thorough discussions of choice of law in product liability cases, including statutes of limitation and repose, see R. Felix and the great conflicts masters, MCDOUGAL, III ET AL.,
supra note 199.
209. See, e.g., Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. The statutes in Connecticut
and Tennessee have some combination of time-certain and useful-life statutes of repose.
210. See, e.g., Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Washington.
211. One might question the characterization of useful-life statutes as statutes of
repose, but that is what they are. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, §
26.05[3][a] (distinguishing time-certain statues, which it calls "true" statutes of repose, from useful-life statutes). While the limitation period of useful-life statutes is
uncertain, these statutes do indeed put an end to (and hence place in "repose") products liability claims at some point. The useful life of a flashlight battery, for example,
might be 3 to 5 years. If acid from a flashlight battery leaks and causes injury after 20
years, a useful-life statute surely would preclude a claim for such an injury.
212. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.05[3][a]; McGovern, supra
note 194, at 598, 638; Zitter, supra note 112, § 45[a].
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"a product liability action must be commenced: ... within ten (10) years after
the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer." '13 This 10-year
repose provision does not apply to asbestos claims, and it may be extended up
21
to two years for claims accruing after eight years. Indiana's statute is atypi-

cal of the repose statutes, most of which are qualified in a number of respects.
For instance, Arizona's 12-year statute does not apply to negligence or express warranty actions; 21 5 Colorado's 10-year statute establishes a rebuttable
216
Georgia's 10-year
presumption that an older product was not defective;
or birth defect, or
"disease
in
resulting
claims
statute does not bar negligence
or wanton disrereckless,
willful,
a
manifests
arising out of conduct which
of the post-sale
breach
for
actions
it
bar
gard for life or property," nor does
2 17
duty to warn; Iowa's 15-year statute does not apply to asbestos, tobacco,
and other types of products; 218 Nebraska's 10-year statute does not apply to
warranty actions subject to UCC § 2-725, nor does it apply to asbestos
claims; 2 19 Oregon's 8-year statute does not apply to claims arising out of asbestos or silicone breast implants; 22° Tennessee's 10-year statute applies if it
is shorter than that state's useful-life statute and does not apply to minors, nor
does it apply to claims from asbestos or silicone gel breast implants which
have a 25-year period; 221 and Texas's 15-year statute applies only to the sale
222 In
of manufacturing equipment that has not been warranted to last longer.
addition, several statutes have exceptions for the defendant's fraudulent conduct; 223 and other statutes specify applicable causes of action, defendants, and
224
One noteworthy
other circumstances to which they do or do not apply.
213. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-3-1(b)(2) (West 1999).
214. See id. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that its repose statute's exception for certain asbestos claims is constitutional. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d
1068 (Ind. 2003).
215. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (West 2003), held unconstitutional by
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1993).
216. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1997 & Supp. 2004).
217. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11 (c) (2000).
218. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
219. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1995).
220. See OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.907-908 (2003).
221. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (2000).
222. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.012 (Vernon 2000 & Supp.
2004-2005).
223. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-107(1)(c) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
52-577a(5)(d) (1991 & Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(2)(b)(2) (Michie 2004);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603303(b)(2)(B) (1994).
224. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.05[3][b]. See, e.g., Masters
v. Hesston Corp., 291 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying Illinois law) (construing
repose exception for products modified after they were originally made and sold and
holding that hay baler was not modified within meaning of exception); Vickery v.
Waste Mgmt. of Ga., Inc., 549 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (plaintiff failed to
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exception to repose statutes allowed by a few courts has been for a manufacturer's breach of its post-sale duty to warn. 2 2 5 The post-sale duty to warn exception rests on the reasonable hypothesis that the purpose of repose legislation is to provide a manufacturer with eventual relief from liability for any
errors it may have made at the time it designed, made, and sold its productsnot for the negligent failure to observe its safety obligations that arise thereafter.
Products liability statutes of repose are drafted quite differently from
state to state, and the courts have passed on a large variety of interpretative
issues. For example, courts have ruled that while the discovery rule does not
normally apply to statutes of repose, 226 it may apply in cases involving latent
diseases such as asbestosis; 227 that a repose statute is not tolled for mental
incompetency 228 or infancy; 229 that it may be tolled by a continuing breach of
duty to warn; 23 that it may bar a claim by a governmental plaintiff notwith23
standing a contrary rule for statutes of
and that it does or does
232limitations;
not apply in a host of other situations.
prove that defendant fell within repose exception for willful, reckless, or wanton conduct).
225. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn.
1988); Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 735 P.2d 614, 618 (Or. 1987);
Sharp ex rel. Gordon v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Wis. 1999). See also Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 746 A.2d 730, 738-39 (Conn. 2000) (continuing duty to
warn; plaintiff not warned that blood she received in transfusion had not been tested
for HIV); Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 575 S.E.2d 673, 678 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (applying failure to warn exception to state's 10-year products liability statute
of repose.). See generally Frank E. Kulbaski, III, Statutes of Repose and the Post-sale
Duty to Warn: Time for a New Interpretation,32 CONN. L. REv. 1027 (2000) (advocating that repose statutes be construed as containing exception for post-sale duty to
warn).
226. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 2002).
227. See Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 336 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. 1985). Some statutes specifically address the problem of latent disease. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.012(d)(3) (excepting claims for disease manifested after 15-year
period expires).
228. See Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000) (plaintiff, who
was on constant pain medication in hospital after accident often did not know where
she was).
229. See Albrecht, 648 N.W.2d at 94-95.
230. See Sherwood, 746 A.2d at 738-39 (plaintiff not warned that blood she received in transfusion had not been tested for HIV).
231. See Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 986 P.2d 536 (Or.
1999). But see People v. Asbestospray Corp., 616 N.E.2d 652 (IlI. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that nullum tempus doctrine immunizes the State from both statutes of limitation and repose).
232. See, e.g., Richardson v. Gallo Equip. Co., 990 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Indiana law) (statute of repose clock begins again once product is reconstructed-after back-up alarm added to forklift); Henderson v. Park Homes Inc., 555
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b. Useful-life Statutes
Following an approach recommended in the late 1970s by the Com233
merce Department's Interagency Task Force on Products Liability, several
234
which is a weak form of
states adopted some form of "useful-life" statute,
statute of repose. Standing between rigid statutes of repose (that conclusively
terminate liability after a set number of years from a product's sale) and
open-ended statutes of limitations (that keep a manufacturer's responsibility
open indefinitely), "useful-life" statutes cut off a manufacturer's liability
conclusively after a period of time, but only after a product's "useful safe
life" has expired. For this reason, useful-life statutes are viewed as something
of a compromise, 235 but a compromise filled236with interpretative land mines
and subject to criticism for being ambiguous.
First enacted in Minnesota, 237 useful-life statutes have also been adopted
in a handful of other states.23 8 Most of the statutes provide that, at the end of
S.E.2d 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (defective synthetic stucco covered by products
liability statute of repose, not real property improvement statute of repose; products
liability statute of repose not equitably tolled by class action filing); Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739, 743-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (human blood is "product" within meaning of products liability statute of repose even though blood otherwise exempted from strict liability claims).
233. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 110(A) (1979), 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,732 (1979). The Model Act provided that a seller would not be subject to
products liability if it proved that the harm occurred "after the product's 'useful safe
life' had expired," unless it had expressly warranted the product for a longer period.
Id. § I I0[A][1]. The term "'[u]seful safe life' begins at the time of delivery of the
product and extends for the time during which the product would normally be likely
to perform or be stored in a safe manner." Id. Evidence on any particular product's
"useful safe life" may include: (a) the amount of its wear and tear; (b) its deterioration; (c) the types and frequency of its use, repair, renewal, and replacement; (d) any
representations, warnings, or instructions about its maintenance, storage, use, or expected life; and (e) whether it was modified or altered. Id.
234. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.0514][a]; Van Kirk, supra
note 192, at 1691.
235. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.05[4][a].
236. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 830-33
(Minn. 1988) (en banc) ("ambiguous"; although jury found that useful life of corroded
26-year-old multi-piece rim for truck tire had expired, court held that statute placed
no limits on duty to warn); Schwartz, supra note 112, at 848 (expressing some sympathy for concept, but criticizing such statutes as drafted for being "incoherent both
theoretically and operationally").
237. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 2000).
238. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(c) (1991 & Supp. 2004) (default rule for a
time-certain statute of repose); IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303(1) (Michie 2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b)(1) (1994) (rebuttably presuming that a product has
exceeded its useful life 10 years after delivery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a)
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(1)-(2) (West 1992), applied in Pardo v.
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its period of safe life, a product is presumed nondefective. A typical usefullife statute is Washington's, which provides: "If the harm was caused more
than twelve years after the time of delivery, a presumption arises that the
harm was caused after the useful safe life had expired. This presumption may
only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence." 239 Among the various
differences between the statutes, Connecticut's normal 10-year period is extended to 60 years for asbestos claims; 240 and the presumption of nondefectiveness does not arise at all if workers' compensation benefits are unavailable, provided that the injury occurs during the product's useful safe life. 241
Tennessee, which has a one-year statute of limitations, 242 blends a useful-life statute with a statute of repose, terminating liability at the lesser of ten
years or one year after the end of a product's anticipated life.243 The statutes
in two other states, Kentucky and Colorado, while not using the "useful-life"
concept, borrow the approach of creating a presumption of nondefectiveness
but apply the presumption after a set period of time. 2 "
5. Realty Improvement Statutes
Many states have another entirely different form of statute of repose that
may bar products liability claims with respect to a narrow category of old
products-those attached to realty. During the 1950s and early 1960s, most
state legislatures enacted real property improvement statutes of repose in an
effort to stem the tide of rising liability claims confronting architects, engineers, and contractors who designed and built buildings and other structures
that could last for decades if not centuries. 245 Like time-certain products liOlson & Sons, Inc., 40 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Washington law) (summary judgment for manufacturer of 21-year-old dump truck reversed and remanded
where plaintiffs expert's affidavit asserted useful safe life was 30 years, putting matter in contention).
239. WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.72.060(2).
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(e).
241. Id. § 52-577a(c).
242. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(b)(2).
243. Id. § 29-28-103(a).
244. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1997 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie 1992).
245. See, e.g., 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.05[5][a]; McGovern,

supra note 194, at 587; Margaret A. Cotter, Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes
for Architects and Builders-Blueprintsfor Non-action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361

(1969); Pamela J.Hermes, Note, Actions Arising out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations, 57 N.D. L. REV.43 (198 1); Jane Massey Draper,
Annotation, Validity and Construction, as to Claim Alleging Design Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations upon Action Against Architect or Engineerfor Injury
or Death Arising out of Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real Prop-

erty, 93 A.L.R.3D 1242 § 2[a] (1979), superseded in part by Martha Ratnoff Fleisher,

Validity, as to Claim Alleging Design or Building Defects, of Statute Imposing Time
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ability statutes of repose, realty improvement statutes of repose begin to run,
not on the accrual of a plaintiff's cause of action, but upon the occurrence of a
designated event-usually the substantial completion of the improvementwithout regard to when the injury occurs or is discovered. The length of time
before repose varies in these statutes from as short as 5 years in Virginia, to
as long as 20 years in Maryland, with a number of statutes at 6 years and the
great majority at 10 years before the repose begins.24 6
Although some of the realty improvement repose statutes expressly provide that they are applicable only to the building professions, and not to products, 247 most of the statutes do not provide explicitly one way or the other,
leaving their application to products liability defendants to the courts. On this
issue the courts have split, some construing their statutes as not applying to
products liability defendants, 24 others holding that their statutes do apply to
249
Several
manufacturers of products that are part of improvements to land.
courts apply a more contextual approach, applying this type of statute of remanner in installing or
pose to manufacturers who also participate in some
2s
0
otherwise constructing a real estate improvement.
Limitations upon Action Against Architect, Engineer,or Builderfor Injury or Death
Arising out of Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real Property,2002
A.L.R.5TH 21 (1995).
246. The statutes are summarized, and annotated, at Statutes of Repose, Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 3100.
247. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(3) (2001); Mo. REV. STAT. §
516.097.2 (2000 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.300 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2005). Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 2000) (repose statute does
not apply to manufacturers or suppliers of machinery or equipment installed in real
property structures). But see Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 331
S.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Va. 1985) (statute excluded only equipment and machinery, not
ordinary building materials such as building's exterior panels).
248. These state statutes do not apply to products liability defendants: Arkansas,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and North Dakota. See 4 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, § 26.05[5] [a] n.86.
249. Such statutes do apply to products liability defendants: Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Utah. See id. § 26.05[5][al n.87.
250. Such statutes may apply to products liability actions if defendant participates
in design or construction of improvement: Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id. § 26.05[5][a]. See, e.g., Meiser v.
Otis Elevator Co., No. CIV. A. 1:03-CV-029-C, 2003 WL 21281645 (N.D. Tex. May
30, 2003). See also Two Denver Highlands L.L.L.P. v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 12
P.3d 819, 822 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute protects manufacturer that is substantially involved in construction); Adcock v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 654 N.E.2d
631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (statute may protect escalator manufacturer that engaged in
substantial installation work at site); J.M. Foster, Inc. v. Spriggs, 789 N.E.2d 526
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (statute protects manufacturer that installed asbestos products in
foundry); Lay v. P & G Health Care, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute does not protect elevator company that assembled, sold, and installed prefabricated dumbwaiter); Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 818 A.2d 330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
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Perhaps the central issue litigated concerning realty improvement statutes of repose is whether a particular product qualifies as an "improvement"
to real property, often generally defined as a permanent addition to realty that
enhances its value. 25 1 Courts have applied these statutes and barred liability
after the expiration of the period of repose in cases involving such products as
precast concrete used in the structural framework of a garage; 252 an outdoor
incline conveyor; 253 a glass vestibule attached to an airport terminal building;254 a mounting plate for an overhead garage door in a warehouse; 2 5 a
larry car for shuttling coal at a coke processing plant; 256 a custom crane; 257 a
manufactured home; 258 an ordinary house; 259 a home furnace; 260 an automatic
garage door opener; 26 1 an in-ground swimming pool; 262 an above-ground
swimming pool surrounded by an elaborate 3-tier deck; 263 asbestos prod266
265
a 27-foot grain bin structure;
ucts; 264 a concrete block curing machine;

Div. 2002) (statute does not protect manufacturer of mass produced underground
storage tanks). See also Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 643 A.2d 81, 86-87 (Pa.
1994) (statute protects manufacturer that provides "individual expertise" on appropriateness of product for incorporation into property improvement). Cf Meneely v. S.R.
Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (statute did not protect trade association
that promulgated safety standards for swimming pool).
251. As in Michigan and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Lanham Mach.
Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (oven was "improvement").
252. See Two Denver Highlands, 12 P.3d at 822.
253. See Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
254. See Enright v. City of Colorado Springs, 716 P.2d 148 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
255. Garner v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 37 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law).
256. See Herriott v. Allied Signal, Inc., 998 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Illinois law).
257. See, e.g., Witham v. Whiting Corp., 975 F.2d 1342 (7th Cir. 1992) (40-ton
crane at steel plant); Bilbow v. Kocks Crane, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-0866, 1992 WL
55745 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1992) (several hundred tons, several stories high, at marine
terminal); Ball v. Hamischfeger Corp., 877 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994) (customized overhead crane).
258. See Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 611
(Mich. 1998) (per curiam).
259. See Jaworsky v. Frolich, 850 P.2d 1052 (Okla. 1992).
260. See Dedmon v. Stewart-Wamer Corp., 950 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law).
261. See Ablin v. Morton Southwest Co., 802 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App. 1990).
262. See, e.g., Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994); Jackson v.
Coldspring Terrace Prop. Owners Ass'n, 939 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App. 1997).
263. See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
264. See, e.g., Trust Co. Bank v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992)
(applying Mississippi law); Tallman v. W.R. Grace & Co., 558 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa
1997); Pendszu v. Beazer E., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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gas transmission lines; 26 7 a sorting conveyor at a farm; 26s a glass door installed in a school; 269 an escalator; 27 and a "Spin Around" playground
amusement ride anchored to the ground.27'
Among the many types of products held not to be protected under various realty improvement statutes of repose are asbestos insulation 272 and asbestos fireproofing 273 sold as standard (not custom) products; fiberglass insulation; 274 a standardized (rather than custom) switch installed in an electrical
supply system; 275 a steel tube mill; 276 a rubber calender machine; 277 a grassseed mixer; 27 a machine for removing doors from coke-ovens at a coke steel
plant; 279 formaldehyde-generating
plywood used as a component in a
28

home; 28° and a diving platform.

1

6. Federal Repose Statute for Small Airplanes--"GARA"
More than manufacturers of most other types of products, manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft were especially hard hit by the rapid expansion of

265. See Freeman v. Paco Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-5906, 2000 WL 709481 (E.D.
Pa. June 1, 2000).
266. See Theunissen v. GSI Group, 109 F. Supp. 2d 505 (N.D. Miss. 2000).
267. See MBA Enters., Inc. v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 717 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(10 year statute; explosion 33 years after installation); S.C. Pipeline Corp. v. Lone
Star Steel Co., 546 S.E.2d 654 (S.C. 2001) (per curiam) (13 year statute; natural gas
pipeline lay peacefully before exploding 38 years after installation).
268. See Cross v. Ainsworth Seed Co., 557 N.E.2d 906 (II. App. Ct. 1990).
269. See Mahathy v. George L. Ingram & Assoc., 584 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.
1979).
270. See Homrighausen v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
271. See Schmoyer v. Mexico Forge, Inc., 621 A.2d 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993),
rev'd, 645 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1994).
272. See Krueger v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 669 N.E.2d 947 (Il1. App. Ct.
1996).
273. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 24 F.3d 955 (7th
Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois law); Uricam Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 739 F. Supp.
1493 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
274. See Petro Stopping Ctrs., Inc. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 906
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App. 1995).
275. See Garrison v. Gould, Inc., 36 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law).
276. See Ritter v. Abbey-Etna Mach. Co., 483 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
277. See McIntyre v. Farrell Corp., 97 F.3d 779 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying Mississippi law).
278. See Christ v. Prater Indus., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 491 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
279. See Vargo v. Koppers Co., 715 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1998).
280. See Ferricks v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 578 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
281. See Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994).
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products liability law during the 1980s, a time when the industry was facing a
number of other serious problems. Within about fifteen years, from the late
28 2
1970s to the early 1990s, the general aviation industry was "decimated.,
Whereas some twenty-nine manufacturers of general aviation aircraft (led by
Piper, Cessna, and Beech) had manufactured more than fourteen thousand
light piston airplanes per year in the late 1970s, by 1993, the remaining nine
283
manufacturers produced only about five hundred small planes.
Congress
finally responded, amending the Federal Aviation Act with the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA).28 4 GARA provides an 18-year stat-

ute of repose, from the date of first delivery, 28 5 for manufacturers of "general
aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and other parts
of such aircraft., 28 6 This federal statute 28 7 makes exception for (and hence
does not bar) claims for fraud,288 breach of express warranty, and those
282. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The GeneralAviation Revitalization
Act: How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM.
1269 (2002); Carter Boisvert, Note, Ninth Circuit Holds the General Aviation RevitalizationAct is Immediately Appealable Under the CollateralOrder Doctrine: Estate
of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 68 J.AIR L. & COM. 631 (2003) (noting

case allowing immediate appeal of trial court's refusal to allow GARA defense);
Timothy S. McAllister, Law Summary, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 & the General Aviation Industry in the United States,
23 TRANSP. L.J. 301, 304-07 (1995).

283. See McAllister, supranote 282, at 306.
284. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L. No. 103-298,
108 Stat. 1552 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994)). "Congress decided that the
economic health of the general aviation aircraft manufacturing industry depended on
lifting the requirement that manufacturers abide the possibility of litigation for the
indefinite future when they sell an airplane." Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078,
1089 (9th Cir. 2001).
285. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) § 2(a), 49 U.S.C. §
40101. See Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107 (9th
Cir. 2002) (GARA clock begins to run on date of first delivery of helicopter to Navy,
not when helicopter later sold as military surplus and resold as general aviation aircraft).
286. GARA § 3(3). A "general aviation aircraft" is defined as a plane having less
than 20 passenger seats and not engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations
at the time of the accident. Id. § 2(c).
287. By simply placing a federal repose on certain old products liability claims,
GARA neither raises a substantial federal issue, establishes a federal cause of action,
nor otherwise "arises under" federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.
See Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
288. GARA § 2(b)(l). See, e.g., Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. 929 F.
Supp. 380 (D. Wyo. 1996) (knowing misrepresentations exception to GARA requires
plaintiff to offer evidence on knowledge, misrepresentation, concealment or withholding required information to or from FAA, materiality, relevance, and causation); Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(manufacturer's failure to report tail rotor yoke failure in violation of FAA's reporting
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brought by passengers being transported for medical emergencies or by persons injured or killed on the ground.289
For each new component added to an existing aircraft, GARA's 18-year
repose period starts anew, a provision aptly referred to as the statute's "rolling" feature. 29 0 The clock thus starts ticking again for manufacturers of replacement parts, 29 1 including a successor of a predecessor company that actually made the part,29229at the time the part is installed in an existing plane.293 In
an important decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that each
aircraft'sflight manual is a "part" of an aircraft falling within GARA's roll294
ing provisions.
Accordingly, the limitations clock for each revision of a
flight manual, if causally responsible for an accident, starts ticking on the date
of the revision. 295 But a manufacturer's revision of a manual on one point will
not stop the clock ticking on other inadequacies in the original manual,
requirement triggered fraud exception to GARA). Compare Campbell v. ParkerHannifin Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (insufficient evidence
of fraudulent representations to FAA).
289. See GARA § 2(b)(2)-(4).
290. See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11) (1994), at 7-8, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1649. GARA extends the limitation period "with respect to any
new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage." GARA §
2(a)(2). See generally Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155, 1156-57
(9th Cir. 2000).
291. GARA § 2(a)(2). But the clock starts anew only for the manufacturer of the
defective component, not for the manufacturer of the aircraft into which it is installed,
even if the latter's name is stamped on the replacement parts together with that of the
actual manufacturer of the parts. See Campbell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209 (twin 1975
Cessna 31 OR crashed due to failure of both engine-driven vacuum pumps, causing
loss of supply to air-driven gyroscopic flight instruments which thereupon provided
erroneous altitude and directional data; although Cessna did not manufacture replacement parts, "Cessna" name stamped on vacuum pumps, replaced in 1984, and
gyroscopic artificial horizon, replaced in 1994).
292. See Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 124, 132-34 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000):
The central objective of GARA would be materially undermined if its protection did not apply to a successor to the manufacturer who, as part of its
ongoing business, acquired a product line long after the particular product
had been discontinued and years after the statute of repose had run as to
the original manufacturer.
Id. at 132.
293. See GARA § 2(a)(2). But the clock is reset only for the replaced part, not for
other parts of the particular system. See Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 4 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 249, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
294. See Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1156-58. Contra Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
295. See Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1158.
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whether misrepresentations or the absence of adequate warnings or instructions. 296 Thus, a manufacturer's post-sale or continuing failure to warn does
not begin the clock anew, because such an interpretation of GARA could
keep the limitations clock forever ticking and so undermine the basic objective of the statute.297
7. Constitutionality of Repose Statutes
By imposing an absolute cut-off to products liability claims after a set
period of time, time-certain statutes of repose sometimes extinguish claims
before they can be discovered, and sometimes even before injuries occur and
claims exist at all. For this reason, some courts 29 8 and commentators have
denounced statutes of repose as fundamentally illogical and unfair, often invoking Judge Jerome Frank's celebrated critique of statutes of limitations for
generating such an "Alice in Wonderland" effect:
Except in topsy-turvy land you can't die before you are conceived,
or be divorced before you marry, or harvest a crop never planted,
or bum down a house never built, or miss a train running on a nonexistent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always
heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal "axiom," that a statute
of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before
that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available

to the plaintiff. 299

296. See, e.g., Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1158; Carolina Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Learjet,
Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Kan. 2001) (manufacturer's issuance of new maintenance manual sections did not restart repose period on owner's claims of failing to
wam owners of a defect in landing gear, and of failing to instruct on proper repair,
since owner failed to allege that landing accident was proximately caused by any
information in manual).
297. See Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). The court
rejected plaintiffs' argument:
that a failure to warn about a newly perceived problem also amounts to
something like replacement of a component part because it breaches an alleged continuing duty to upgrade and update [which would gut GARA]
because the plaintiff could always argue that an 18-year period commenced if the manufacturer did nothing at all, while simultaneously arguing that if the manufacturer did do something that, too, would start a new
18-year period running.... [A] failure to warn is decidedly not the same
as replacing a component part with a new one.
See also Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (limitations clock is not tolled by post-sale or continuing duty to warn).
298. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295-96 (N.H. 1983).
299. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank J.,
dissenting).
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So reasoning, several courts have struck down products liability statutes
of repose for being unconstitutional,3 °0 sometimes as applied to particular
types of products liability claims. 30 1 The typical constitutional objection is
that repose statutes violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the
federal or a state constitution, or that they abrogate the open courts provision
of a state constitution. 302 Nevertheless, most courts have upheld products
liability statutes of repose against a variety of these and other constitutional
challenges. 303 Similarly, while some realty improvement statutes of repose

300. In addition to the Heath case in New Hampshire, see Lankford v. Sullivan,
Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Hazine v. Montgomery Elev. Co., 861
P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1993); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1980) (per curiam); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). See also Wells v. Thomson. Newspaper Holdings,
Inc., 183 F.R.D. 225, 227-30 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of
LaMoure, 611 N.W.2d 168, 173 (N.D. 2000) (holding unconstitutional statute of
repose reenacted in 1995 after Hanson). Products liability statutes of repose have been
repealed in at least two states, Florida and South Dakota. See 4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 29, § 26.05[2][a] (products liability statutes of repose) and § 26.05[5][d]
(realty improvement statutes of repose); McGovern, supra note 194; Hicks, supra
note 194; Zitter, supra note 112.
301. See, e.g., Jurich v. Garlock, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 1066, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(unconstitutional as applied to asbestos claim), rev'd, 785 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. 2003).
But other courts have held that a repose statute's exception for certain asbestos claims
is constitutional. See, e.g., AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. 2003).
302. See, e.g., Branson v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc., 221 F.3d 1064, 1065-65
(8th Cir. 2000) (applying Iowa law) (rejecting challenges on all three grounds); Olsen
v. J. A. Freeman Co., 791 P.2d 1285 (Idaho 1990) (same).
303. See, e.g., Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Indiana law) (Indiana's product liability statute of repose does not violate state's
equal protection or due process provisions); Branson, 221 F.3d at 1064-65 (Iowa's
15-year repose statute for products liability actions does not violate equal protection,
due process, or state's open courts provision); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134
(6th Cir. 1983) (applying federal and Tennessee law) (repose statute does not violate
constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations); McIntosh v.
Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 973 (Ind. 2000) (10-year repose statute violates neither
open courts provision nor privileges and immunities provision of state constitution);
Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67, 72 (N.C. 1985) (repose statute does not
violate "exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges" clause of state constitution);
Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435 (Or. 1990) (repose statute does not violate minor's
right to jury trial under state constitution, among other constitutional challenges).
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have been held unconstitutional, 3 4 most have withstood constitutional scrutiny. °'To date, GARA has proved immune to constitutional attack.3 °6
IV. CONCLUSION
Commentators often overlook less glamorous products liability defenses, such as reliance on a purchaser's design specifications, the regulatory
compliance defense, and statutes of limitations and repose. Compliance with
a purchaser's design specifications may protect a manufacturer from liability
for defects in design, whether the manufacturer contracts to build the product
for the government or a private enterprise. This result is usually only fair and
logical, and here the law ordinarily lies quite close to justice. While regulatory compliance in most situations is seen to be far weaker than a true "defense," it sometimes provides a commonsense defensive plea which may influence the trier of fact to render a decision for the defendant, and courts and
lawyers need to recognize its potential significance as well as its -more common limitations. Products liability litigation is usually not controlled by statutes of limitations and repose because most claims are instituted in a timely
manner. Yet, when circumstances conspire to delay the filing of an action
until after such a statutory period has arguably run its course, the principles of
whether and how such a statute may apply are thrust into the center of the
dispute. Special products liability defenses may apply less regularly than
those based upon a plaintiff's conduct, but they can control the outcome of
the litigation when they do.

304. See, e.g., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 814-15 (Ky.
1991) (statute arbitrary and violates open courts and limits on legislative power provisions); Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio 1994) (violates open
courts provision of state constitution).
305. See, e.g., Baugher v. Beaver Constr. Co., 791 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 2000); Patton
v. Yarrington, 472 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth,
Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1991); Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 766 P.2d 1317 (Nev. 1988);
Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999);
1519-1525 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass'n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 6 P.3d 74 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2000), aff'd, 29 P.3d 1249 (Wash. 2001).
306. See Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1085-88 (9th Cir. 2001) (although GARA was not passed until after accident, it violated neither due process nor
equal protection).

